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Abstract 
This thesis aims to examine whether the military government has been an influential 
actor in shaping a new trajectory in Thailand energy policy, hence creating the 
Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. In order to understand whether and how the 
intricate interrelation functions between the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint and 
the military government. The case study will be applied as research design to analyze 
such process has undertaken. Firstly, a detailed and critical account of the historical 
and political relationship will be elucidated to examine Thailand’s institutional 
development as well as the interconnection between the military coup and the 
insertion of the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO) as the new government 
administration. Secondly, the thesis will look at Thailand’s energy situations, 
including its future challenges; investigating the historical paths that have resulted in 
the establishment of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. Thirdly, three distinct 
theoretical tools derived from the historical institutionalist approach, are employed to 
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1. Introduction 
Siam1, a country in which colonialism has never officially set foot, has taken 
an alternative path to state building compared to its neighboring countries. Yet, the 
void left by absence of colonialism was filled by royal nationalism, which created a 
sense of belonging to the land of Siam for the Thai people. The evolution of royal 
nationalism was instigated through the establishment of the royal institutions during 
the rule of King Watchirawut in the year 1910-1925. The creation of the royal 
institutions resulted in the development of cumulative nationalism through 
propaganda, education and rewriting of the Thai history (Anderson, 1978). This paved 
the way for royal nationalism to prosper and become the central ideology in the 
country. The core values of the ideology included, loyalty to the monarchy as well as 
respect for authority and hierarchy. This ideology prominently became the foundation 
for the countries state building process (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 239).  
 
However, in year 1932, the history of Thailand was changed drastically by a 
revolution in which led to an abolishment of the absolute monarchy and an 
establishment of the constitutional monarchy (Udenrigsministeriet, 2015). Even 
though the revolution undermined the power of the monarchy, it did not succeed in 
bringing an end to monarchy in Thailand. The monarchy instead created an unusual 
alliance with the military and maneuvered their way to shape and influence Thai 
politics for decades (Marshall, 2014, p. 79). Since the introduction of the 
constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has experienced a total of eleven 
completed coups and seventeen attempted coups (Ferrara, 2012).  
 
Military coups have played an important role in nation building, for better and 
for worse. Nevertheless the strength of the military institution has often grown with 
the action of a coup (Janowitz, 1964). In Thailand the coups have also played an 
important part of the institutional development and the nation building. Through these 
roles, the Thai military has become one of the strongest institutions in the country, 
making them a part of a normative solution to balance the Thai Democracy (Rakson, 
2010). By executing coups, the military has largely gained its institutional strength in 
                                                
1 Thailand’s original name until 1948  
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the name of protecting the monarchy, hence received the royal blessing in 
legitimizing their actions (Anderson 1978).  
 
In contrast, within this system, the political parties have not received the same 
blessing, Under the system of royal nationalism and its core values, political parties 
tend not to debate over any major political principles or ideologies2 but instead fight 
in a battle for spoils, In other words, the parties in Thailand fight each other by 
damaging their opposition leaders’ reputation. This type of political strategies has 
resulted in Thai politics to favor personalism where a single charismatic leader 
becomes the central part of the party, rather than a political ideology (Kuhonta, 2011, 
p. 167). Personalism perpetuated weak institutional parties because the parties only 
existed through the existence and support of the party leader. Without the leader, the 
party would crumble. The lack of ideology in the political system also implies that 
that party could move more freely in government coalition in order to gain influence, 
without protest from supporters. Nevertheless, such political system inevitably leads 
to a weak government coalition, and hence institution (Kurlantzick, 2011). Because of 
weak governmental institutions, corruption turns to be an inevitable solution for a 
weak government to run things more smoothly (Méon, 2010). 
 
In the recent political trajectory of Thailand and after years of political 
turbulence between the red-shirts and yellow-shirts3, the military declared martial law 
nationwide to create peace and put an end to political deadlock in the country. The 
22th of May 2014, marked as the official date, where the former Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra was overthrown and the National Council of Peace and Order 
(NCPO) singlehandedly took the reign of the country. The following month resulted 
in the creation of two new institutions namely, National Legislative Assembly (NLA) 
and National Reform Council (NRC), the members of which were selected by the 
                                                
2 There are indeed strong ideological powers in the creation of the first political parties and during the 
development of Thailand, however in the later stage of modern Thailand ideologies have been a 
diminishing part of the current political struggle (Marshall, 2014, p. 4-5).  
3The red-shirts represent the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) mostly 
consisting of rural dwellers and workers who are supporters of the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. The yellow-shirts represent the group formally known as the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD) consisting mostly of royalists and the extreme nationalists. 
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military. With King Bhumibol’s4 blessing to the newly made interim constitution it 
finally gave the military full legitimately to the coup (BBC, 2014). 
 
 Additionally, the military choose to maintain control until the political crisis 
has been settled. The 21st august 2014 marked as a day of transformation in the 
political landscape by the introduction of General Prayut Chan-Ocha, a 
former Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, as the new self-promoted Prime 
Minister of Thailand (Udenrigsministeriet, 2015). With the establishment of a new 
government, the state agenda was altered in its forms and content. Among countless 
changes that followed the coups, are, the creation of new institutions, rotation in the 
cabinet members, new state sanctioned regulations, tightened security measures, 
increased surveillance, numerous policy amendments across several sectors and a new 
constitution in the near future (Sriring, 2015). 
 
In view of the changing political landscape of Thailand and the ensuing 
ramifications, this thesis focuses on the changes in the Ministry of Energy. One of the 
most noticeable developments in the Ministry of Energy is the rotation of the new 
cabinet, introducing General Anantaporn Kanjanarat5 as the new minister of energy. 
In his early period of work at the Ministry, he has initiated Thailand’s new master 
plan towards a better future named: the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. The 
plans’ major purpose is to harmonize the Thai energy policy, which has had a history 
of ambiguities and inconsistencies. The Integrated Energy Blueprint consists of five 
revised energy plans across the different sub-ministries in the Ministry of Energy. 
These five revised plans include: Power Development Plan 2015, the Gas Plan 2015, 
the Energy Efficiency Plan 2015, the Oil Plan 2015 and the Alternative Energy 
Development Plan 2015 (Sutabutr, 2015). 
                                                
4 Also named as King Rama IX, reign: 1946-present 
5  General Anataporn has military background and held prominent positions in many different 
institutions, such as Government Expenditure Monitoring Committee (GEMC), Rehabilitation and 
Restructuring Subcommittee (SOE), National Anti-Corruption Committee (NACC) and is a member of 
the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Furthermore he was an independent director in 
Krug Thai bank and Thai airway (Energyforum, 2015).  
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Figure 1: The Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint 
 
Source: DEDE, 2015 
 
Undoubtedly, institutional development has swayed depending on different 
circumstances in the Thai politics. The most notable institutional developments often 
depend on the type of system, which governs the country. In fact, it is dependent upon 
whether the governing system is democratic, quasi-democratic or a military regime. 
However, institutional change is a rare thing, but sometimes appears in an event, 
where a problem/crisis needed to be resolved. In this regards, it can be pinpointed that 
an intuitional change occurs predominantly during a regime change. This leads to a 
question: whether the military government extends its influences in the newly 
formulated policy changes in the Ministry of Energy? There are indeed challenges in 
the ministry of energy, such as, the current energy policy, which are threatened by the 
energy security6 issue Thailand is currently facing and the lack of institutional 
structure in the ministry (Changsorn, 2015). The issues the Ministry of Energy is 
currently facing will be explained in-depth in the later chapters.  
 
Thailand with its unique state-building futures having the monarch of head of 
state has become the trailblazer for the development of the military institutions 
through the blessing of the royal nationalism ideology, aimed at guarding the King. 
The military institutions have established into one of the corner stones in the state-
building process and have paved the way for many institutional changes in the 
country.  
 
                                                
6 Brown defines energy security in four aspects, namely: (1) Availability of energy (2) Affordability of 
energy (3) Efficient consumption (4) Environmental stewardship (Brown, 2010). 
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It is illuminating to examine the ongoing intuitional changes in Thailand and 
analyze, which paths such changes might take? This puzzling concoction has 
prompted the important questions on; how institutions are formed in Thailand and 
how new policy is created and configured. It is therefore the aim of this thesis to 
examine whether any influences were inflicted upon the Thailand Integrated Energy 
Blueprint by the current military government. This inquiry hence serves as a basis of 
the thesis’ problem formulation. 
Spring 2016 Aalborg University  DIR 
  9 
 
2. Problem formulation 
The brief overview articulated in the introduction has given a fundamental 
insight into the institutional development in Thailand and served, as an explanation on 
how royal nationalism, has become the fundamental ideology in Thailand. Royal 
nationalism entails a formation of the alliance between the two strongest institutions 
in the country, namely: the military and the monarchy. Together, they have steered 
the institutional changes and development in Thailand, transforming the military coup 
to become a normative solution for the country’s problems.  
 
Resting on this interesting yet confounding background, the thesis will 
examine how the military uses their power to influence and dictate the country’s 
development. This attempt to examine such complex issue has created the foundation 
for the following problem formulation. 
 
 
To what extent is the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint a result of influences by 
the military government? 
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3. Research Method 
In this chapter, the chosen research design will be presented, followed by an 
argumentation for the selected field of research. Further, research limitations 
particularly in the context of conducting the study in Thailand will be explained. 
Acknowledging the limitations is useful in the application of the selected 
methodological tools, namely, document analysis to extract information from the 
empirical materials and in putting into perspectives, the credibility of these sources. 
Finally the method chapter will end by examining the validity of the research in the 
above-mentioned context and arguing whether this research upholds the required 
criteria as a valid research. 
 
3.1. Research design  
This thesis employs case study as its research design. George & Bennett 
define a case as “an instance of class of events” (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 17). An 
event is also known as a phenomenon, such as regimes, revolutions, economic 
system, etc. This make case study versatile and have the ability to capture complex 
understanding in the chosen case (Bryman, 2012, pp. 66-67). This is one of the 
reasons that case study has been frequently used as a way to examine historical 
episode, hereby developing and discovering historical explanation, which can be used 
to generalize on other events (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 5). Case study is a popular 
research design in the field of political sciences, since it can be used to examine 
individual persons as well as complex institutions.  
 
There are many types of case studies and multiple ways to explore an answer 
to a given problem formulation. Case study can be studied both as a single case and as 
multiple cases. It serves to either examining a general cohesiveness or a unique 
phenomenon (Antoft, 2012, p. 31). However, examining similar events from multiple 
cases will increase the validity by supporting each other. Accordingly, it is crucial to 
discern a case that reflects all the essential aspects needed to get a vast enough picture 
of the phenomenon and ensure the most optimal reliable, repeatable and valid 
research structure (Bryman, 2012, pp. 66-68). A well-defined case is not a direct 
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historical event, but rather an aspect of a historical episode, which encapsulates the 
very essence of the phenomenon (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 18).  
 
For this thesis, the selected case study is the recent military coup in Thailand, 
which has resulted in the establishment of military government. This is indeed a 
phenomenon, which needed to be better construed. By selecting the current military 
coup as the fulcrum of this study, it will be regarded as a single case. Nevertheless 
using multiple cases as an alternative approach to answer the problem formulation 
could give a more complete answer, hence increasing the validity of such study. 
Although a multiple case study could enhance this study and its validity, it has not 
been chosen as the research design, given time and other limitations endemic to this 
study. All in all, a single case study is chosen principally to keep the thesis stringent 
in its scope in examining mainly the current military coupe and the current Thai 
energy policy. Moreover the selected case, the 2014 military coup is considered, 
within the scope of this thesis, to be the best case study that will generate, a 
trustworthy answer to the problem formulation because of its recent occurrence.  
 
More specifically, the recent changes in Thailand energy policy and the launch 
of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint, arguably one of the most important 
transfigurations of the national energy policy, have occurred under the current 
military regime. Thus the recent coup is determined as major force in changing 
energy direction of the country. Although previous military coups could be employed 
to answer the same problem formulation, it is highly likely that they would result in a 
different conclusion, since the 2014 military coup has different characteristics and 
motives compared to that of 2006.  
  
In addition, to seek a lucid answer to the problem formulation, it is pivotal to 
identify the appropriate area of research to examine into. There are many fields of 
research, which could be examined in the realm of Thai energy policy. The most 
relevant and interesting fields include: Power Development Plan, Gas Plan, Oil Plan, 
Alternative Energy Development Plan and Energy Efficiency Plan, which altogether 
construct the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. Each of these research fields 
contains considerable amount of information, which can be used for the analysis. Yet 
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it will be improbable to cover them all given the time and other related limitations for 
this thesis. Therefore, this study will concentrate on the Power Development Plan due 
to its roles as anchor and foundation of all other energy plans. 
 
3.1.1. Research limitations  
Doing research which touches upon Thai politics and contested area of 
national policies as a foreigner, entails some methodological disadvantages especially 
during the empirical gathering process. To begin with, language barrier poses 
significant challenge during research process. A large number of official documents 
and policy papers are written in Thai language. Consequently, empirical materials 
consulted for this thesis are limited to those written or translated into English. This 
inevitably can affect the findings of the thesis. It is although possible to overcome this 
barrier by using a translator. However, translation creates further methodological 
restriction, such as, the loss of the real meaning of terminology and of the original 
empirical material (Temple & Young, 2004, pp. 161-179).  
 
Further research limitations include, the choice of the field of research in this 
thesis. Given choice made; it prioritizes a certain type of empirical materials, hereby 
excludes others. The selection of the field of research, namely, the Power 
Development plan favors empirical materials and data from this policy plan, hence 
disregards empirical materials from the other four policy plans, which are also a part 
of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. Since, the thesis will only view in the 
perspective from the Power Development Plan in regards to answer the problem 
formulation. There are indeed aspects of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint, 
which are not fully clarified, such as, their oil policy.  
 
Additionally, interviews are not chosen as research method for this thesis. 
Although interviewing high-ranking people would offer interesting insights on the 
topic. It is not being opted for because of the limitations including weak credibility, 
limitations on critical thinking and tendency to self-censor among the interviewees. 
Furthermore, getting access to the high-ranking individuals in the hierarchical system 
under the tightened reign of the military regime can be challenging and often 
impossible, not to mention the lengthy administrative processes required.  
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Freedom of speech 
The most concerning obstacle lies in the sphere of the laws of Thailand and its 
ramifications on censorship where research on controversial subjects is prohibited. 
Specifically, after the 2014 coup, the academic freedom has drastically weakened in 
Thailand. The universities have experienced increasing military presence in the 
campus, including military personal monitoring lectures and discussion. Mechanism 
such as, the interim charter, lèse-majesté law, military presence, detention, 
punishment and pressure have hindered the academic freedom in Thailand 
(Chanwanpen, 2015). The most tangible and example of this constraint is the 
censorship in order to protect the monarchy, which is of the highest priority of the 
Thai government. On the Thai government official website, it is stated as follows:  
 
“It is an extremely important duty of the Government to uphold, and protect the 
monarchy. Proper legal, psychological, and ICT measures will be employed to cope 
with those having malicious intent against the monarchy” (Thaigov, 2014). 
 
The lèse-majesté law, which dates back to the year 1908, forbids defaming, 
insulting, accusing and threating the King, the Queen and their heirs. Even though the 
law seems straightforward, the definition vis-a-vis types of crime is undefined and 
swings from case to case. This lack of clarity has caused the law to be “misused” and 
has been used frequently by the current military junta (Sabur, 2015), (ilaw, 2016). 
Hence, it is evident that freedom of speech does not fully exist in Thailand, which 
results in methodological complications for this thesis. Conducting research on and in 
Thailand with regard to sensitive subjects, such as: politics, human rights, class 
struggle and conflict, and corruption, etc., carries the risks, in a number of instances 
as witnessed in the past, to pertain the monarchy in some ways, since they are major 
figure in the country.  
 
This implication instigates important questions: how can you conduct research 
about Thailand without the risk of being called in by the authorities for “attitude 
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adjustment7” or even imprisonment without compromising the academic values? This 
question has implications on the credibility of the empirical materials gathered for the 
analysis. To answer this question a categorization system will be applied to classify 
the empirical materials on Thailand. The categorization system has the purpose to 
facilitate the use of document analysis by dividing the empirical materials into two 
categories, which will be applied to determine the credibility of a document. 
 
1. The first categorization are scholars who are currently based in Thailand 
where their critical thinking is considered in line with the Thai laws, 
restraining from expressing opinions on controversial issues, hence may 
compromise academic values. 
2. Second, scholars who are living outside Thailand. They are therefore not in a 
dangerous position within the reach of Thai laws. This enables the scholars to 
be fully critical about Thai affairs without bearing deleterious consequence 
other than the possibility of not being able to enter the country.  
 
The thesis uses empirical materials from the both categories. Yet empirical 
materials are treated differently depending on their topics, but their credibility 
remains dependent on its categorization. This will be further discussed in the 
following section on document analysis. 
 
3.2. Empirical data gathering 
The strength of case study is often associated with the use of qualitative 
method, however in reality case study can take multiple paths of empirical choices; 
meaning it has the possibility to use a diverse set of empirical materials both 
quantitative and qualitative (Bryman, 2014, p. 68). This thesis will not only utilize 
qualitative materials, but also combine it with quantitative data. By using empirical 
materials form both quantitative and qualitative sources, it also enlarges the 
possibility to better reflect and understand the field of research from more diverse 
lens.  
                                                
7 Attitude adjustment is a method applied by the military government to neutralize critical people and 
their thinking especially the ones who oppose the regime. The critics are detained, interrogated and 
disciplined in a military camp (Rojanaphruk, 2015). 
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This thesis will be using a multiple set of empirical materials. Empirical 
materials from a number of primary and secondary sources will be applied. The 
primary sources include: the Thailand Ministry of Energy and its sub-ministries, such 
as, the Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency (DEDE), The 
Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO). Furthermore, the secondary sources can 
be categorized among additionally studies conducted by specialist in both field of 
energy and Thai affairs made by international organizations, civil society, professors 
and other interest groups. Lastly, sources from news media, both Thai medias, such 
as, Bangkok Post, The Nations, Prachathai and international medias including: BBC, 
Al Jazeera, Economist, Telegraph and the Diplomats will also be part of the empirical 
material. 
 
3.2.1. Document analysis 
Document analysis involves the use of document. A document can be 
contracts, official documents, newspaper, biography, etc. The only true requirement 
for a document is that its context fit in the given researches that are being conducted 
to enable information extraction (Bryman, 2012, pp. 543-544). Document analysis 
uses three factors to judge, whether the document can be used for the later analytical 
work. These three variables include, authenticity, credibility and the meaning of the 
document (Duedahl & Jacbosen, 2010, pp. 52-68). 
 
As mentioned above, empirical materials on Thailand have a range of 
implications vis-a-vis credibility issue, which necessitates a categorization to better 
judge the materials especially with the use of document analysis. This thesis will use 
document analysis respectively in the documents presented earlier. The majority of 
the empirical material comes from: official reports, presentation and other documents, 
including both quantitative and qualitative date from the Ministry of Energy and its 
sub-ministries, hence, The Department of Alternative Energy Development and 
Efficiency (DEDE) and The Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO). 
 
The authenticity of the empirical materials gathered from the ministry of 
energy and its sub-ministries can be considered authentic, since it is primary official 
government document. However, the meanings of the document are sometimes 
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inconsistent in both data and statements, when comparing similar documents 
presented by different sub-ministries. This inconsistency in the content and meaning 
of the document will reduce the overall credibility of the empirical materials. It can be 
argued that the absence of centralized policy planning process among the different 
sub-ministries has contributed to this inconsistency. Even though the credibility of 
document presented by the ministry of energy and its sub-ministries are considered 
low; there is unfortunately no better alternative data, meaning that the empirical 
materials presented by the ministry of energy will be applied in this research to 
answer the problem formulation. In regards to the categorization system mentioned in 
the above section, the primary empirical material gathered from the Ministry of 
Energy and its sub-ministries are categorized as the first categorization; scholars who 
are based in Thailand. However, the empirical material from the Ministry of Energy 
and its sub-ministries are threated differently, since their empirical material does not 
evolve around sensitive topics. 
 
The authenticity of both Thai and international news media is considerably 
good, since all the news applied are from respectable and recognized media with good 
authenticity. However, the credibility among the Thai news and media is considerably 
lower than international ones. This was explained in the categorization system 
presented in the previous section. Since journalists working in the Thai news and 
media are most likely under the first categorization. To elaborate, the journalists’ 
critical thinking is firstly self-censored to be in line with the Thai laws and secondly, 
re-censored by the military government before being published in the news and other 
forms of media. This undermines the overall credibility of the Thai news and media 
sources. Conversely, the international news and media are not as restrained by the 
same level of censorship, making them more credible than their Thai counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the news applied in this thesis is aimed to define timelines and clarify 
historical events. In other words, the application of the documents is for 
straightforward purpose and therefore less likely to be misunderstood. As a result, the 
low level of credibility in the Thai news media is being compensated by more 
credible sources from international news and media.  
 
The authenticity of the empirical material gathered from various studies by 
both international organizations and researcher are considered authentic, due to their 
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expertise on the fields including both energy and Thai affairs. Yet, their credibility 
varies depending on whether a researcher can be categorized as either living in 
Thailand, hence is limited by the Thai laws or living abroad, enabling them to be 
more critical without fear of punishment. Although empirical materials from both 
categorizations have been applied. Only empirical materials from researchers who 
have the possibility to be critical without censorship are applied when analyzing the 
institutional development of Thailand to ensure good credibility.  
 
All in all, there exist indeed credibility issues, when conducting research in 
Thailand. This can be summed up into two points. Firstly, the lack of full freedom of 
speech in Thailand, which reduces the level of critical thinking of researchers and 
journalists who restrain themselves for fear of punishment by Thai laws. Secondly, 
the lowered credibility can be discerned in the official documents presented by the 
ministry of energy and its sub-ministries who seem to have difficulties to streamline 
the numbers and the policy planning process. This bottleneck makes the policy reports 
complex to comprehend and synthesize. Nevertheless, it remains a negligible loss of 
credibility that needed to be sacrificed for this type of study to be accomplished, since 
there are no better alternative materials.  
 
3.3 Validity 
Validity is probably the most important criteria for a study, since an invalid 
study will not contribute to future research. Validity can be measured in two distinct 
ways: internal validity and external validity. Internal validity concentrates on whether 
the study is measuring the appropriate causality in the variable that is been examined 
(de Vaus, 2011, pp. 247-248), whereas external validity focuses on the generalization 
power in similar studies (Bryman, 2012, pp. 47-48). Case study has its ability to 
achieve solid conceptual validity owing to its ability to understand a given 
phenomenon.  
 
In other words, case study can be used to identify and measure indicators, 
which causes or represents the phenomenon. In this regards, it is important to note 
that the phenomenon which social sciences often examine are those that are difficult 
to measure, such as: power, regime, institutions, etc. Therefore the researchers tend to 
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contextualize the phenomenon and compare it with equivalent events. These 
phenomena, which are difficult to measure is something that the qualitative study can 
effectively engage, which quantitative studies fails to. Case study can be used to 
examine a small number of cases and still achieve high validity (George & Bennett, 
2004, p. 19). 
 
This study uses case study as its research design with the dependent variables 
as “Thai energy policy”, which are affected by the independent variable ”the coup”. 
Examining these variables gives this thesis a good internal validity. This can be 
supported by the introduction explaining the role of military and the monarchy in the 
nation building process, which have resulted military interventions to be normalized 
in Thailand. Furthermore, implementation of the Thailand Integrated Energy 
Blueprint and the insertion of a military figure in the Ministry of Energy support the 
existence of such causality. Through the gathered empirical material from various 
sources and implementation of the theoretical approach of historical institutionalism 
the thesis will scrutinize, to what degree the causality exists between the coup and 
Thailand energy policy exists.  
 
In regard to external validity, this study fulfills the required criteria for having 
good external validity among similar cases. Its explanatory power can undoubtedly be 
used to explain other field of research that is affected by military coup. An example of 
other field of research can be in the areas of national and macro level policies, which 
are largely influenced by the coup and the military. Yet this thesis’s explanatory 
power is confined within the chosen case, namely the 2014 military coup.  
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4. Thailand’s institutional development 
This chapter is built upon the content from introduction and will further explain the 
institutional development in Thailand. It is vital to understand the institutional 
development in order to scrutinize the relationships between the state, the military, 
the monarch and the political parties in the country. Firstly, this chapter will give an 
insight into Thailand development since the Siamese revolution to capture the 
creation of the military might and the modern Thailand. Secondly, there will be a 
concise explanation of the impact that the Asian financial crisis have instigated upon 
the country, followed by the rise of Thaksin8. Further, this chapter will elucidate the 
development of the current political crises, commencing from the influx of the military 
coup in 2006. Ultimately, Thailand political crisis in particular the resurgence of 
Thaksin and the recent military coup will be elaborated. 
 
4.1. Building the military state 
The Siamese revolution was initiated by an organized group of military 
officials, who created the first political party in Thailand. The party was named the 
Peoples Party9, which became the foundation of the elite society in Thailand. With 
peaceful manners, the coup d’état was carried out, stripping the monarch of the 
political power and placing the king under constitutional control (Reynolds, 1987). 
Later, the military was successful in gaining momentum within the people’s party and 
was able to deter any uprising by hampering political parties to settle, hence political 
parties were therefore forced to operate under the shadows to avoid constant state 
interventions. This strategy led the military to become successful in creating a strong 
foothold within the Thai state. This highly constraining origin and environment 
ultimately created a weak institutionalization processes in the Thai political party 
system (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 38). More importantly, this overwrought condition shaped 
an antagonistic relationship between the state and the political parties. 
 
                                                
8 Leader of Thai Rak Thai party and Prime Minister of Thailand in the period 2001-2006 
9 People party or in Thai: Khana Ratsadon was formed by a small group of people, but gathered 
strength quickly resulting in a coup leading the first constitutions of Thailand.  
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After the reign of King Prajadhipok or Rama VII10, the mysterious death of 
the King Ananda or King Rama VIII 11 shocked Thailand. The newly founded 
Democrat party functioned as a conservative and royalist party opportunistically 
utilized the death of King Ananda to spread rumors and suspicions against the former 
Prime Minister Pridi Banomyong12 to be the King’s slayer. This event had shattered 
the monarch and resulted in the newly appointed King Bhumibol or King Rama IX to 
flee the country under the pretense of further education abroad. In the absence of a 
king, a military intervention had occurred, overthrowing the elected government in a 
move to protect the monarch. Through the use of the King Anada’s death and a letter 
of approval from the current King Bhumibol13, the military coup in 1947 was without 
difficulty legitimized (Marshall, 2014, pp. 75-76). The political demise of Pridi and 
the liberals, which was demolished along with the ideals they represented, became 
much easier for the military and the conservatives, each in turn, to shape the country’s 
political system to their own tastes and requirements (Kobkua, 2003). 
4.2. The development of modern Thailand 
The coup in 1947 was successful resulting in the longest period of military 
ruling, which lasted for over 25 years. By blaming Pridi for the murder of the King 
Anada, the military successfully buried the ideas of liberalism and democracy that he 
represented. The suppression of liberalism and democracy facilitated the military to 
shape the future political outcome with absolute legitimacy through the blessing of 
King Bhumibol (Marshall, 2014, p. 77). Yet it was not long before a new challenge 
emerged. In fact, there was a growing uncertainty vis-à-vis the loyalty of the newly 
flourished elites, mainly the Thai-Chinese families, who have overtaken a large 
portion of the Thai economy, including the financial and manufacturing sectors. 
These Thai-Chinese business people have also become an essential part of the Thai 
economy, since they have been a key component of transforming Thai economy away 
from primary sectors, such as, farming and towards modern industrialization. The 
influence that the Thai-Chinese families have gained through economic fortune began 
to contest the monarch and the traditional elites, including: the monarchy, the 
military, senior bureaucrats and allied businessmen (Haller, 2014). The unknowing 
                                                
10 King Prajadhipok ruled in the period of year 1925-1935 
11 King Ananda Mahidol ruled in the period of year 1935-1946 
12 Pridi Banomyong the prime minister of Thailand in the period of year 1946 until 1946.  
13 A letter sent to the coup groups on the 25th November 1947   
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fact about their stance towards the monarch posed major threat towards the traditional 
elites including the military government. In pursuit of a solution to neutralize the 
Thai-Chinese families, the traditional elites employed unfamiliar strategy by 
welcoming these families into the warmth of the Thai elite society and by providing 
them with the protection of the military in return of their loyalty and support to the 
King. This strategy paved way to the inclusion of these allied businessmen to become 
a part of the newly enhanced elite society of Thailand.  
 
Even though the military government succeeded in keeping the Thai-Chinese 
families in check and benefited from their loyalty and economic power. The strategy 
used by the military had brought them double beneficial effects. By keeping the Thai-
Chinese under the military’s sphere of influence, the military government has also 
gained trust as well as support from the United States with whom they needed to 
secure alliance. Being able to get hold of the influential Thai-Chinese, the United 
States implied that the spread of communism was being contained14 (Mishra, 2010, p. 
119). At the same time, the Thai-Chinese was also satisfied with being accepted and 
welcomed under the tutelage of powerful military regime. This power play by the 
military government worked magnificently, resulting in an enormous growth in the 
Kingdom of Thailand that made Thailand the fastest growing country in the world at 
the end of the cold war (Jory, 2014).  
4.2.1. The bump on the road and the rise of Thaksin  
Despite long period of spectacular economic growth, such growth was 
eventually disrupted. In the year 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit Thailand like a 
tsunami, leaving a devastated destruction in the country’s financial system. Stock 
market plummeted while the currency was markedly depreciated after removing its 
peg to the US dollar. The fast-evolving crisis led to the loss of confidence in the Thai 
economy (Phongpaichit, 2009).  
 
The beginning of a new 21st century was also a new beginning of Thailand. In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, a new politician rose by the name of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. Thaksin and quickly filled the void of future economic prosperity. 
                                                
14 The ban of communism led to a cooperation with the United States and the military regime, hence 
gaining American support through foreign investments.  
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Thaksin was a successful businessman and was a billionaire through the establishment 
of a telecommunication company. Supporters of Thaksin and his newly created party 
named, Thai Rak Thai, consisted of two distinct groups of people. The first group was 
the business community, who shared the same vision to generate wealth. 
Nevertheless, Thaksin and his party acknowledged that the support from the business 
community was not enough to win an election. He turned towards a group of people 
who never had a voice in Thai politic, specifically, the rural people. Thaksin and his 
party gained support from the rural voters by running election campaign with strong 
appeal to the rural population through promising reforms that would enable 
distributions. This targeted strategy was somewhat a novelty in Thai politics. An elite 
engaging in politics was nothing new, but a politician who made it possible address 
the interest of the rural population was something never happened in Thailand before. 
The support from the business community and the rural people was more than enough 
for Thaksin to win his first election with a great victory in the year 2001. Through 
political reforms, he continued to gain massive support from the rural areas by 
introducing universal healthcare system, minimum wage and enabling social 
distribution, which secured Thaksin and his party a re-election in 2005 with a 
landslide win (Marshall, 2014, pp. 20-25, 154-165). 
 
Certainly, Thaksin changed the way politics functioned in Thailand and with 
increasing popularity he swiftly became a challenger towards the traditional political 
elites. Even though the Thai Rak Thai party won the election by ample majority in 
2005, there was an increasing opposition with skepticism towards Thaksin’s ruling. 
The opposition was greatly dissatisfied with the election’s result. They accused 
Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai party of vote-buying, disloyalty to the monarchy, 
violation of human rights15, corruption and of exploiting his position for personal 
rewards. This had led to widespread demonstration and protest against Thaksin 
regime. Eventually the protesters merged into a new political movement, namely, 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), also known as yellow-shirts. The yellow-
shirts consist mostly of middle-class conservative royalists who self-represent as 
protectors of the monarch by wearing the symbolic color of the King Bhumipol 
                                                
15 A campaign against drug on war, which resulted in over 2000 extrajudicial killings  
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(yellow). The yellow-shirts wanted to maintain the traditional status quo, where the 
political power remained in the hands of the traditional elites (Haller, 2014).  
 
These accusations escalated to further political turmoil and heightened 
scrutiny of Thaksin and his party’s political legitimacy. In response, Thaksin called 
for an early election. With the perspicuous victory from previous election, it was 
assumed that the early election would work in his favor. However, his strategy 
backlashed when the newly formed party, People’s alliance for Democracy (PAD), 
rejected the election through blocking elections posts. The political crisis deteriorated 
and reached its peak, when it was revealed that Thaksin sold one of his own 
companies, Shin Corporation16. It was condemned that the so-called “Shin Corp. 
deal” was made through the exploitation of legal loopholes in the Thai taxation 
system. This opaque deal together with ever-growing dissatisfaction from the yellow-
shirts triggered public outrage. The protestors then demanded that Thaksin step down 
from his position (Ferrara, 2011). 
 
4.2.2. The fight for political legitimacy 
The year 2006 became one of the most intractable political turmoil in modern 
Thai history; resulting in another successful military coup. The coup, with its 
immaculate design, took place during Thaksin’s visit to New York for the UN 
General Assembly meeting. After the military have taken over the control of the 
government, Thaksin was charged for corruption and a dismantling process of the 
Thai Rak Thai party was initiated. Due to the charge and its severe punitive 
ramifications, he seeks a voluntary exile abroad. Over hundreds of Thai Rak Thai 
politicians were also indicted with corruption allegation, banning them for engaging 
in future politics for five years. As for Thaksin, he decided not to face the corruption 
allegation and opted for a self-imposed exile. Despite absence of Thaksin and the 
party, his supporters remained active through continuous demonstrations. The lasting 
loyalty made it possible for Thaksin to continue exerting his political influence in 
Thailand. Owing to this support, Thaksin was able, through the use of proxies, to 
gather his supporters and regain some of his shattered power. Later, a new political 
                                                
16 Thailand’s leading telecommunication company 
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party; the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) was established by 
Thaksin’s supporters (Marshall, 2014, pp. 154-165). 
 
The battle of political legitimacy persisted culminating in a series of violent 
protests and confrontation between the red-shirts and yellow-shirts camps. In year 
2008 within the context of political void and absence of election, Abhisit Vejjajiva 
was appointed as Prime Minister by the constitutional court of Thailand taking over 
the position of the military government in 2008. The political conflict in Thailand 
escalated to its climax17 when the National United Front of Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD) strategically started strategies of protest in Bangkok against 
Abhisit’s legitimacy. In contrast to the yellow-shirts and their scrutiny of Thaksin 
regime, the UDD and Thaksin supporters known as “the red-shirts” demanded that the 
newly appointed democrat Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, to step down from his 
position and call for a democratic re-election. Amidst the political quagmire, Abhisist 
was defeated in the general election in 2011(Thabchumpon, 2011), (BBC, 2011). 
 
4.2.3. Yingluck and the embodiment of Thaksin  
In the next election, Thaksin again employed the proxy strategy by using his 
sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, the founder of Pheu Thai party18 as a nominee. Pheu 
Thai party won the election on 3 July 2011 with tremendous victory as a single 
majority in the parliament. Yingluck and Pheu Thai party shared the same 
ideology/values as Thaksin. This commonality enabled Thaksin to effectively 
influence Thai politics with his sister and the Pheu Thai party as puppets despite 
being in exile in London (Marshall, 2014, pp. 196-198). 
 
Nonetheless, another political conflict was looming large after Yingluck 
proposed an amnesty bill, which would dismiss almost all corruption charges among 
the 100 people who were banned from politics. It was believed that the bill proposal 
was staged to allow Thaksin to dismiss his crimes, restore his private fortunes and his 
political power (Marshall, 2014, pp. 197-200). This bill triggered demonstration, 
                                                
17 This period became one of the most violet events in modern Thai history with thousands of injuries 
and over 90 people killed, consisting mostly of redshirts protestors. (BBC, 2015) 
18 In the absence of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai and Peoples Power Party in the year 2008 the Pheu Thai 
party was founded.   
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reigniting political tension. The protesters eventually merged into a new movement, 
named: Peoples Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) led by a former Thailand 
Democrat Party member of parliament, Suthep Thaugsuban (Haller, 2014). In spite of 
previous experience, Prime Minister Yingluck responded to the pressure from the 
opposition by taking a defensive maneuver and calling for an early election.  
 
History seemed to repeat itself; with lack of political legitimacy, a political 
vacuum was created and the two symbolic colors of shirts, red and yellow, pursued 
aggressive demonstrations fighting against each other once again. Finally, the day of 
election was decided, however the yellow-shirts kept on demonstrating and insisted 
on the election boycott by blocking election posts, knowing their chance of winning 
was slim (Haller, 2014), the election took place as planned on the 2nd February 2014, 
the result of the election was annulled. Thailand once again faced political deadlock, 
which ended in military intervention on 22nd May 2014. The elected government was 
stripped of their governance by a military coup. The military have, after the coup, 
continued to run the country with the creation of the National Council for Peace and 
Order (NCPO). Since then promises of a future election by the military regime have 
been delayed. The drafting of a new constitution, which needed to be completed 
before election could take place, was proclaimed as an excuse for the delay (Al 
Jazeera, 2016), (Marshall, 2014, pp. 200-207). 
 
4.2.4. A unique coup and a new opportunity 
It has been argued that political conflict in Thailand and the inevitability of 
military intervention are rooted in the skirmish between colors and classes. Given the 
more proactive role and stance of rural population vis-à-vis politics, it has become 
increasingly challenging for traditional elites to maintain status quo.  
 
Amidst ongoing political crisis and ambiguity, another critical but rather silent 
issue is the future of the Thai monarchy. This subject is so sensitive that Thai people 
rarely speaks about it. And when they do, the words are articulated to be as implicit as 
possible. This is particularly true for the subject of the forthcoming royal succession 
after the death of King Bhumibol. With his frail heath and fragile condition at 90 
years of age, succession is inevitable in the near future. Yet, the statue of King 
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Bhumibol is the pinnacle of the Thai society as he is the most respected person and in 
some cases, is referred to as God. His death will bring upon a long lasting period of 
grief, however whether the transaction period will be a smooth or a rough journey 
towards the possible successor, the crown prince Vajiralongkorn, can be discussed 
(Marshall, 2014, pp. 107-109).  
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5. Development of Thailand’s energy policies 
This chapter will present the development of Thailand energy policies, followed by a 
brief explanation of the current energy situation in Thailand and its future challenges. 
Afterwards, there will be an overview of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint 
explaining Thailand’s future energy targets. Lastly, this chapter will delve into an in-
depth examination to better comprehend the complexity of the chosen field of 
research, the Power Development Plan. 
 
5.1. The foundation of Thailand energy policies 
Thailand inevitably has fallen victim to the global energy crisis in the 70s and 
economic crisis in the 80s, leading to high inflation and unemployment. Given the 
lack of proper governmental structure and absence of cohesion between energy 
agencies, the energy issue remained intractable. This rendered it even more 
problematic for the government to control and monitor the energy-flow. This resulted 
in haphazard and incompetent administration, which detrimentally affect the 
formulation of future energy policies. The first step of Thailand energy policies 
started on 8th September 1986 under the military government with the establishment 
of National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) and the National Energy Policy Office 
(NEPO). Subsequently, Prime Minister Genereal Prem Tinsulanonda19 adopted the 
country’s first energy policy; the National Energy Administration (EPPO. A, 2015). 
 
Yet, it was only in the year 1992 that a more unified institutions was 
developed through the National Energy Policy Council Act appointed by King 
Bhumibol. The act introduced a permanent establishment of an office with a license to 
operate, develop and regulate energy policies. The members of the National Energy 
Policy Council (NEPC) consisted of the Prime Minister as chairman, Deputy Prime 
Minister designated by Prime Minister as vice-chairman and a minister attached to the 
office of the prime minister designated by the prime minister, including all head of the 
ministers and the Department of Energy Development and the National Energy Policy 
Office (Thailaw, 2010). 
                                                
19 Genereal Prem Tinsulanonda was prime minister of Thailand in the period from 1980-1988. 
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 In spite of an establishment of National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) and 
National Energy Policy Office (NEPO), it was evident that a lot had yet to be 
improved concerning the government structure in order to maximize the potentials of 
Thailand energy sector. In the year 2002, under the Thaksin administration additional 
policy reform was undertook with an aim to increase effectiveness of the government 
agencies. One part of the “restructuring of the government organization act” included 
an establishment of a government’s bureau of energy, which later became known as 
the Ministry of Energy (EPPO. A, 2015). 
 
5.2. Thailand’s current energy situation and future challenges 
Thailand’s energy demand has been increased drastically over the recent time. 
Despite its best effort to address this problem through different means, such as 
alternative energy and energy efficiency solution the problem remains and their 
dependency on imported fossil fuel has been the inevitable result (FAO, 2009). 
Currently Thailand is measured as the second largest energy consumer in the region 
of ASEAN. Additionally, they are measured as the second worst energy efficient 
country in the ASEAN region as well, measured by energy intensity20 (Enerdata, 
2014). Thailand is a net importer of energy, importing 44 % of the consumed energy 
in the country in year 2014 (DEDE, 2015). The dominant type of energy consumption 
is crude oil, which is mostly used in the industry and transport sectors and gas, which 
is used for electricity generation. Thailand is expected to have their energy demand 
double within the next 15 to 20 years (EPPO, 2014),(EIA, 2014). To meet the demand 
Thailand is forced to import energy resources through their neighbors, mainly: Laos, 
Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar, making them highly dependent on good foreign 
relations (Source). The figure below, visualizes the ratio between imported and 
domestic production of various energy sources.  
                                                
20 Energy intensity is a measurement, which are used to examine the level of energy efficiency in an 
economy. It is measured by calculating the amount of energy consumed in order to create one unit of 
GDP. 
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Figure 2: Ratio of import and domestic production in 2014 
 
Source: EPPO, 2014 
 
As shown in the above figure; Thailand imports a majority of its crude oil and 
coal/lignite. However the country currently produces most of its natural gas and 
generates its own electricity. Since Thailand is a developing country, it is expected 
that the electricity demand will rise up markedly in the next decade. It is estimated, 
with the growth measured in 2013, that the electricity demand will double within 25 
years (Nation, 2013). Thailand produces its electricity from various of sources, 
however gas have been prioritized throughout history because of its efficiency in 
electricity generation (EIA, 2016). The figure below shows Thailand’s electricity 
generation mix in 2014. Is can be seen that a dominant use of gas in Thailand’s 
electricity generation is followed by coal/lignite as well as imported electricity. 
Despite that, Thailand has limited reservoir of natural gas, meaning if the country 
continues to generate electricity through gas in the future, it will be expensive and 
unproductive since gas needs to be imported through other costly means, such as, 
liquefied natural gas. Inevitably, when the natural gas reservoir diminishes, Thailand 
will become even greater net importer of energy. It is therefore pivotal for Thailand to 
find new alternative ways to reduce its use of natural gas in the future electricity 
generation in order to maintain competitive electricity resources and preserve 
adequately extent of energy security (Changsorn, 2015). 
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Figure 3: Thailand electricity generation mix in 2014 
 
Source: EPPO, 2014, p. 49 
 
5.3. The Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint 
The military coup on 22nd of May 2014 caused significant changes across the 
politics and policy of Thailand. Among the most noticeable changes is the 
abolishment of the old institutions and with an interim constitution designed by the 
military government as replacement (Caryl, 2014). Nevertheless, there were many 
other changes that have occurred, which have not gained as much media attention. 
This includes eleven new policy suggestions across different sectors by the military 
government. Among the elven new policy suggestions, a new energy policy was 
presented. With regard to energy policy, the policy suggestion emphasizes on the 
following five points (EPPO, 2015, c.3, p. 1). 
 
1. Increase of the transparency in the ministry of energy and its policy planning 
process 
2. Reduction of the environmental impact 
3. Improving the cooperation cross neighboring countries  
4. Implementation of new technologies and innovation to further enhance the 
energy efficiency and the development of modern infrastructure  
5. Enhance the economic competitiveness  
 
In view of these five points, the planning process of the Thailand Integrated 
Energy Blueprint was initiated. The purpose of Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint 
is to enhance the overall competitiveness both economic and energy supply, through a 
unification and increased development of an energy policy that are cohesive with each 
other (Sutabutr, 2015). To create a cohesive energy plan, the following five plans 
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have been revised: Energy Efficiency Development Plan (EEDP), Power 
Development Plan (PDP), Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP) and Oil & 
Gas Plan. Indeed, these plan have all been synchronized and adapted to calculate 
forecast variables from the year 2015 with a target of achieving the goals at the end of 
year 2035-36. In the table below, an overview of their purpose and targets is 
presented. 
 
Table 1: The Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint 
Plan Description Target 
EEDP 
- Remove subsidies to convey market price 
signals 
- Improve energy efficiency through, 
accountability, enforcement and better bench-
marking 
- Achieve 30% energy intensity 
reduction  
PDP 
- Improve the power mix by generating more 
electricity from clean coal technology  
 
- Reach 30% coal in power mix  
- Implement 20% clean coal 
AEDP 
 
- To achieve target of renewable energy sources 
three types of approaches will be focused upon: 
biomass and waste, solar and wind 
- Biofuels, increase yields and limit imported 
fuels 
 
- Improve zoning and competitive 
bidding 
- Reach 15-20% renewable energy 
sources for electricity generation 




- Stimulus oil & gas policies to counter 
production decline  
- Control gas demand  
- Limit domestic gas decline rate at 
around 2-5% 
- Build LNG structure 
- Decrease/ remove fossil fuel subsidy  
Source: Sutabutr, 2015 
 
5.3.1. Power Development Plan  
The Power Development Plan is a policy plan, which lays the foundation of 
Thailand’s current energy situation and the outlook of the future. The plan is aimed to 
maintain a reliable flow of electricity supply while upholding the power system 
security, hence avoiding blackouts. Furthermore, it also serves the planning of future 
project to maintain the supply and enhance the overall energy structure (EPPO, 2012, 
p. 5). Prior to the year 2010, the Thailand Power Development Plan was formulated 
and managed by the state-owned enterprise, the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT).  
 
EGAT generates the majority of the electricity in Thailand and functions as 
the single buyer of imported energy through their transmission network. EGAT 
determines the quantity and the quality of the energy production in Thailand, 
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including decisions on the type of project initiated, and the timing on when and where 
(Greacen, 2012, p. 7); since EGAT was the main investor and operator in future 
projects, it had held the authority, de facto and de jure, to organize and dictate the 
Power Development Plans. The first revision was created by EGAT to determine the 
policy planning process, however the second revision was created jointly with EGAT 
and the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) under Abhisit administration and 
the third and final revision was created under Yingluck Administration. In order 
words, each of the revision was created through a different actor. All three versions 
are called the Power Development Plan 2010, but to make it less confusing when 
referring to, the following terms: Power Development Plan 2010 for (Revision 1), 
Power Development Plan 2011 for (Revision 2) and Power Development plan 2012 
for (Revision 3) will be used. 
 
Figure 4: Development of Power Development plan 
 
Source: Wongla, 2013 
 
All three Power Development Plans has been approved and endorsed by the 
cabinet, however the plans have been revised several times to be in line with the 
demand forecast and the development of Thailand’s economy. In the following 
sections there will be a brief explanation of the Power Development Plans: 2010, 
2012 and 2015. 
Power Development Plan 2010 
The Power Development Plan 2010 focuses substantially on improving 
Thailand’s energy security through extending the future outlook to plan 15-20 year 
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ahead (EGAT, 2010). The key assumption of the Power Development Plan 2010 can 
be confined into (Chimklai, 2012).  
 
• Reduce fuel dependency from natural gas 
• Uphold a reserve margin of minimum 15 % of total capacity 
• Increase power imports from neighboring countries,  
o However, this import is limited to a capacity of 25 % of the total 
electricity generation 
• Increase efficiency and clean energy from cogeneration and clean coal 
• Implement nuclear electricity generation 
 
The Power Development Plan 2010 was revised after the catastrophic nuclear 
power plant crisis triggered by the tsunami in Japan, leading to changes in the nuclear 
power plant programs in Thailand and postponing the nuclear project by three years. 
In other words, the Power Development Plan 2010 and 2011 resemble each other. In 
the table below, the details on how the energy generations are distributed across the 
different power plants are presented. The plants are planned to raise electricity 
generation capacity that would deliver 65,547 MW, at the end of year 2030. The 
forecast is measured with the values of year 2009 with the capacity of 29,213 MW 
and with an expectation of retired capacity of 17,671 MW (Chimklai, 2012). 
 
Table 1: PDP 2010 added electricity generation capacity in 2030 
Renewable energy power plants 16,798 MW 
 Power purchase from domestic 4,617 MW 
  Power purchase from Neighboring countries 11,669 MW 
 Pump-storage hydro power plant 512 MW 
Combined cycle power plants21  16,670 MW 
Thermal power plants 20,537 MW 
 Cogeneration22 7,137 MW 
  Coal-fired power plants 8,400 MW 
  Nuclear power plants 5,000 MW 
Total 54,005 MW 
Source: Chimklai, 2012 
                                                
21 Combined cycle power plant is a gas power plant that uses steam turbine to increase the production 
and efficiency of electricity generation. The waste heat generated by the gas turbine is rerouted to a 
steam turbine to generate extra electricity. 
22 Cogeneration is a combined power plant that generates electricity and reuse waste heat/cooling at the 
same time.  
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Power Development Plan 2012 
A deadly flood, changes in administration and the shattering economic 
situation affected Thailand’s growth rate, which resulted the administration to change 
the Power Development Plan to respond accordingly to the situation and to predict a 
better future output. The Power Development Plan 2012 is the final revised version of 
the Power Development Plan 2010. The 2012 plan was reworked entirely under the 
Yingluck administration. Among the changes created in the Power Development Plan 
2012 was the creation of two new sub-plans with the purpose to achieve a better 
efficiency and use of alternative energy resources.  
1. Implementation of a new Alternative Energy Development Plan 2012-2021 
(AEDP) with the purpose to increase the share of renewable and alternative 
energy. The goal is to replace 25% of the fossil fuel in 10 years period.  
2. A new power demand forecast, which incorporates a new energy efficiency 
program, the Energy Efficiency Development Plan 2011-2030 (EEDP), with 
focus on reducing the energy intensity by 25 % by 2030 
Furthermore, there are implemented a new strategic framework to deal with the 
supply forecast. Focusing on six different measures to supply the future energy 
demand (EPPO, 2012, pp. 2-4). 
1. To avoid blackouts and to supply in high seasons; a power system 
security with a margin consisting of 15 % of the calculated peak power 
demand value will always be available. 
2. Diversification of energy sources, reducing the use of natural gas in 
power generation 
3. The energy generated through future nuclear power plan should not 
excide 5 % of the energy generation. Additionally, the nuclear projects 
will first start three years later in 2023. 
4. Increase in electricity generation through clean coal technologies 
5. Energy purchase from neighboring countries should not exceed 15 % 
of the generation capacity. 
6. Increase use of energy generation though cogeneration system. 
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The Power Development Plan 2012 anticipates the need for generating 70,686 
MW of energy at the end of year 2030 (EPPO, 2012, pp. 3-6). In the table below, the 
details on how the energy generations are distributed across different power plants are 
demonstrated. The table presents the future electricity mix for the Power 
Development Plan 2012. The numbers are calculated based on the values of 
December 2011 with the capacity of 32,395 MW and with an expectation of retired 
capacity of 16,839 MW (EPPO, 2012, p. 2). 
 
Table 2: PDP 2012 added electricity generation capacity in 2030 
Renewable energy power plants 14,580 MW 
 Power purchase from domestic 9,481 MW 
  Power purchase from Neighboring countries 5,099 MW 
Combined cycle power plants  25,451 MW 
Thermal power plants 15,099 MW 
 Cogeneration 6,476 MW 
  Coal-fired power plants 4,400 MW 
  Nuclear power plants 2,000 MW 
  Gas turbine power plants 750 MW 
 Power purchase from neighboring countries 1,473 MW 
Total 55,130 MW 
Source: EPPO, 2012, p. 2 
Power Development Plan 2015 
The Power Development Plan 2015 is the latest plan that replaces the previous 
Power Development Plan 2012. On the 15th august 2014, the policy suggestions 
presented were approved by the National Energy Policy Council, which established 
the framework for the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. The Power Development 
Plan 2015 became the centerpiece of the structure; functioning as a benchmark in 
order to streamline policies, adapt the development to respond to changes in 
economic, infrastructure development and the ASEAN economic community (AEC) 
(EPPO, 2015, c.3 p. 1). The Power Development Plan 2015 was approved and 
endorsed by the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) on the 6th May 2015, 
followed by the acknowledgement by the cabinet on the 30th June 2015. Its main 
focus lies in energy security, economy and ecology (EPPO, 2015, c.3 pp. 1-3).  
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Table 3: The core strategy of Power Development Plan 2015 
 
Source: (EPPO, 2015, c. 5, pp. 1-9). 
 
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, a new forecast have been 
undertaken in order to predict and prepare for future demand. It is estimated with the 
growth values of 2014 that, there will be generating 70,335 MW of electricity, at the 
end of year 2036. In the table below, the details on how the energy generations are 
distributed across the different power plants are presented. The forecast is measured 
with the values of December 2014 with the capacity of 37,612 MW and with an 
expectation of retired capacity of 24,736 MW (EPPO, 2015, c.5, p. 7). 
 
Table 4: PDP 2015 added electricity generation capacity in 2036 
Renewable energy power plants 23,749 MW 
 Power purchase from domestic 12,105 MW 
  Power purchase from Neighboring countries 9,543 MW 
 Pump-storage hydro power plant 2,101 MW 
Combined cycle power plants  17,478 MW 
Thermal power plants 16,232 MW 
 Cogeneration 4,119 MW 
  Coal-fired power plants 7.390 MW 
  Nuclear power plants 2,000 MW 
  Gas turbine power plants 1,250 MW 
 Power purchase from neighboring countries 1,473 MW 
Total 57,459 MW 
Source: EPPO, 2015, c.5 p. 8 
Energy Security 
• Secure all power generating compounds 
• Have an appropriate reserve margin to tackle power peak demand of 15 % 
• Construct new transmission and distribution infrastructure to support the development of ACE and GMS 
power integration 
• Maintain the other energy producing companies act on behalf of the power purchase agreement 
• Integration of smart grid technology to enhance the realbility of renewable energy sources 
• Improve the fuel densification 
• Reduce the use of natural gas in electricity generation 
• Replace with clean coal technology 
• Purchase electricity from neighboring countries, however this cannot excide more than 20 %of total 
electricity usage.   
• Encourage both public and private to invest in renewable power generation 
• Proceeded with nuclear power plants as planned 
• Manage the increasing power demand  
Economy 
• Maintain competitive pricing on the cost of 
electricity 
• Implement energy efficient solution 
• Reduce the use of subsidy on fossil fuel to better 
reflect the primary cost 
Ecology 
• Reduce CO2 emission in power generation 
• Reduce environmental impact and social 
impacts 
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6. Theory 
This chapter aims to explore, which theoretical approach is most appropriate to base 
this thesis’ analysis upon. There will be a presentation of three distinct theoretical 
approaches, which could be used for this thesis and a discussion of the pros and cons 
of these theories. Lastly, there will be an explanation of the selected theoretical 
approach, explaining different analytical tools, which will be implemented in the later 
analysis. 
 
6.1 Selection of theoretical approach 
Understanding how influence and decisions inform and form any policy is a 
complex endeavor. Therefore it requires a suitable theoretical approach through which 
the intricacies of how any policy is formulated can be disentangled. There are several 
types of approaches, which could be adopted to examine the problem formulation of 
this study. Nonetheless not all approaches are well fitted with the chosen case and 
problem formulation. The approaches, which will be considered below are: economic-
, social- and institutional approach respectively. Even though these three approaches 
do not cover every approach that can be used in this type of study, it does cover the 
commonly applied approaches in the case study that this thesis has dealt with.  
Economic approach 
Economy has been the focal area of many studies, which examine decisions in 
policy-making processes. Indeed, the economy is intrinsic to policy formulation 
process, since economic conditions often dictate what a government can afford to do 
or not. This condition creates an intertwining process when policy is planned, since 
economy is a dominant part of the calculation (Stastny, 2002). In this regards, public 
issues are often related to economic ones, such as: fiscal policy, industrial policy, 
agricultural policy, labor policy, energy policy, etc. This is particularly true for policy 
concerning production and distribution, which has a tighter relationship with 
governments, hereby economies (Stastny, 2002).  
 
To illustrate such connection, the theory of cost-benefit analysis can 
demonstrate a straightforward decision-making process in policy formulation. Here, 
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cost, risk and benefit are measured to derive an optimal decision, based on economic 
reasoning. The theory functions best with economic variables, which are measurable 
in numbers; rather than non-numeric variables, are applied (Shachter, 2005). This 
foundation explains why an economic approach is one of the reliable ways to examine 
policy process.  
Social approach 
Secondly, the social approach could also be applied to give different 
perspectives on this study by viewing how behaviors affect the decision-making in 
policy process. The social approach is often associated with behaviorism, which focus 
lies on the individuals rather than on the institutions. Behaviorism uses culture and 
society formation as variables to comprehend decision-making process. Culture is 
formed as a totality of the individuals in a society, hereby enabling the use of culture 
as a way to generalize how people are thinking, acting and feeling. Whereas, society 
is a result of relationship crated by individuals through networking. Among politician 
these relationship is a big part of their work by mingling among powerful and 
influenced people (Dahl, 1961).  
 
In this regards, Public Choice Theory combines behaviorism and economic 
rationality as an argument to examine how behaviors and decisions are constructed. 
Public choice is often associated with rational choice, since the fundamental 
assumption of public choice theory includes the concept of rationality. Public choice 
theory’s starting point looks at how economy affect politics by delving into how 
personal rationality play a role in the decision-making process among actors. In sum, 
public choice theory uses rational choice theory as its basis to explain the individual 
behaviors in decision-making process. Individuals do what they can for self-
maximizing purpose. Hence, based on this approach, politicians and voters value self-
interests over anything. Their decision-making will then often be a result of self-
maximizing interests in order to gain votes, wealth or other forms of influence 
(Mitchell & Simmons, 1994, pp. 46-50). The rationality of how these individuals 
behave lies within their border of self-interests, guiding them towards a decision, 
which will eventually benefit their ego (Bayreuth, 2005).  
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Institutional approach 
The institutional approach is associated with the structural approach, because 
institutions are viewed as structures that organize human society. The institutional 
approach lays emphasizes on the role of institutions in shaping the society. It is 
widely adopted to examine important political phenomena (Taylor & Hall, 1996, p. 
6). In fact, there are many types of institutionalism ranging from old to new 
institutionalism. However the use of old institutionalism is diminishing. On the other 
hand, new institutionalism is gaining popularity and commonly used in case analysis 
in the social/political studies. 
 
 Among the new institutionalist approach, there exist three types of theoretical 
approaches, which are wildly used: Sociological institutionalism, Rational-Choice 
institutionalism and Historical institutionalism. They are all unique in their analytical 
and explanatory power in finding answers to a specific phenomenon through their 
analytical tools. This also makes institutionalism an excellent choice for case studies, 
since institutionalism can be used in examining variety of case studies. These 
institutionalists have all one thing in common, which is institutions matters (Steinmo, 
2008, pp. 118-119), however they differ in their perceptions on how actions/behaviors 
are structured. 
 
The rational choice institutionalism argues from a standpoint that human 
being is rational individual who make conscious calculated choices. This calculation 
is often in a form of cost contra benefits, which steers their rationality towards self-
maximizing purpose. Rational choice institutionalism uses this logical basis to 
elucidate a strategic behavior vis-a-vis why individuals sometimes co-operate with 
others and follow institutional rules (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 127-128). 
 
Sociological institutionalism argues from a perspective that institution comes 
before individuals. Human being is not self-interested and also not rational in their 
decision-making, instead they are ”satisfiers” in the society. They do not follow the 
logic of self-maximizing ground, but rather ”logic of appropriateness”, entailing that 
they will ask themselves what is appropriate to do in a given situation dictated by the 
institutional rules (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 127-129). Sociological institutionalism is 
commonly applied in the study of cultures where procedures, organization structure, 
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ceremonies are examined as a transmission of cultures practices towards creating 
more efficient institutions (Taylor & Hall, 1996, p. 14).  
 
Historical institutionalism views humans as both rule followers and rational 
actors. Yet, how an actor behaves is still dependent on a context, rules and on that 
individual her/himself. Accordingly, historical institutionalism regards humans as 
complex creatures capable of making arduous decision, which is not always rational 
or rule abiding. Further, historical institutionalism uses history as a way to examine 
how an institution is developed and transformed over time. This makes historical 
institutionalism a very good theoretical approach to investigate, why a certain choice 
was made and why a certain outcome occurred, such as political outcomes/decisions 
(Steinmo, 2008, pp. 126-127). 
6.1.1. Argumentation of theories 
As presented above, there are a number of approaches, which could be applied 
to answer the problem formulation. Despite that, not all approaches are applicable to 
answer the problem formulation with this thesis’ selected case and chosen field of 
research. Further discussion and justification for the choice of analytical approach for 
this thesis will be presented in this section. 
Economic approach 
There are several advantages in choosing the economic approach as mentioned 
previously. These advantages include an indivisible relationship between policy and 
economic condition of a country, and decision-making process shaped by economic 
reasoning. However, the economic approach has its limitation in understanding more 
complex decision-making process where other variables inevitably influence the 
process. In addition, in the context of Thailand, the lack of “perfect” market23 in the 
Thai society makes decision relying solely on economic reasoning nearly 
unfathomable. Rather, in Thailand where corruption is part of everyday life, decisions 
are, to a large extent, made resting on social/institutional relations and other non-
economic factors. This can especially be witnessed in the aftermath of the military 
coup resulting economic recession; where domestic security/stability is prioritized 
over economic growth (Economist, 2014). Given all these reasons, the economic 
                                                
23 Perfect market is an economic term, which includes condition, such as, perfect information, large 
number of buyer/sellers, homogenous products, no market barriers, rational buyers, etc.  
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approach and the theory of cost benefit analysis are not being used for this study as 
the theory is founded on economic variables and reasoning.  
Social approach 
Conversely, the social approach is deemed better suited for the examination of 
the chosen case study where behaviors are a part of the key variables in the analysis. 
This approach could potentially offer insights on how the individuals rationalize their 
decision. The theory of public choice could be applied enabling to discern how policy 
is made. This would allow a better grasp regarding the variables and behaviors that 
influence such decision. Nevertheless, there are a number of constraints that are 
intrinsic to the social approach and the public choice theory. Their tenet is constructed 
upon how individual actors behave; hereby underplay the institutional perspective, 
which is often indispensable in understanding any policy formulation and process. In 
similar vein, the focus of the public choice theory lies in the individual’s self-
maximizing choices; thus resulting in rationalized decision. The application of these 
approaches could offer an intriguing insight into an individual’s behavior and his/her 
decision, such as, examining: General Prayut Chan-o-cha, General Anantaporn 
Kanjanarat and other important individuals. Given the circumstances of Thailand 
where government reshuffling is common, such application will only generate limited 
credibility, whereas viewing the ministry of energy and the military government as 
institutions will enable a more solid analysis and a conclusion to the study. 
Institutional approach 
The institutional approach conceives institutions as norms and rules that 
dominate policy-making process. Rational choice institutionalism combines economic 
reasoning with an institutional understanding, yet as it draws its analytical power from 
economic rationality, it is unable to escape from the weaknesses similar to economic 
approach. Likewise, sociological institutionalism argues that institutions shapes the 
individuals by determining what is socially appropriate for them. However what 
defines appropriateness in the “murky” Thai politics is rather vague. The murky and 
vague terrain of Thai politics makes it very complex to map out the culture and norms 
based on which policy is created. Certainly, this approach could be applied to this 
case. But examining culture-based approach will lead to a less tangible answer to the 
chosen problem formulation.  
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Against this background, historical institutionalism is most suited to the 
objective of this thesis, since it considers humans as both rational actors but also as 
rule followers. Hence the approach is very versatile to examine political process as 
well as its outcomes. Furthermore, in a country like Thailand where history tends to 
repeat itself, the historical argumentation through an investigation of patterns and 
recurring phenomena will be beneficial in answering the problem formulation. This 
serves as an analytical framework of previous process, which can be used to analyze 
future policy process. The section below deals with an in-depth explanation of the 
different analytical tools, which historical institutionalism offers conducting an 
analysis.  
Limitation of historical institutionalism 
Institutionalism has its strength in examining and explaining complex policy 
structure through the argumentation of institutions. Nevertheless, the strength of this 
approach can also be viewed as its weakness. Critics of historical institutionalism 
criticize on a small number of samples that can be tested in a historical context. A 
small number of samples, the critics argue, impair the overall repeatability and 
validity of such research. More specifically, the cases chosen are not randomized. 
Rather there exists a selection bias, when choosing the dependent variables. This is 
because the theory is only applied in a context where an interesting phenomenon has 
taken place, hence ignores the cases that have not produced the so-called interesting 
phenomenon. Lastly, historical institutionalisms tend to look at causality of the big 
picture and are criticized for forgetting the simplistic association. This can be 
exemplified in the focus of institutions contra individuals. The critics point out that 
the individuals are the reasons for the existing of institutions; hereby not studying the 
individual level will invalidate any analysis (Pierson, 2002). 
 
There are indeed pros and cons for any theoretical approach. A good historical 
institutionalist “does not only look at the forest, but also the trees” (Pierson, 2002). 
Historical institutionalism does indeed have some implications, especially on a small 
sample size of cases that can be studied, which often consists complex isolated 
studies. However, this implication is also the driving force for the historical 
institutionalists. Research made by historical institutionalists rarely makes great 
changes. Yet it provides a small step forward in creating a better understanding of the 
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holistic view of a given phenomenon. These small changes, all together, contribute to 
a big pool of accumulated knowledge that is driven by problem solving. Therefore 
questions, hypothesis and historical patterns are reformulated, retested and 
reexamined. Because historical intuitionalism tends to focus on complex 
phenomenon, these studies are repeated several times over many generations. The 
repetition helps creating small progresses over a long period. Historical intuitionalism 
has thus contributed to our understanding of the long-term transformation of society. 
“Most of our knowledge about the relationship between democracy and various other 
factors (social classes, international conditions, elite behavior) has been derived 
through such step-by-step accumulation...” (Pierson, 2002). 
6.2. Historical institutionalism 
In adopting an institutionalist approach, it is crucial to define what institutions 
are? For the purpose of this thesis, basic definition will be applied as working 
definition. Institutionalism, in this thesis, stands for both formal and informal 
procedures, rules, routines and norms that structure behavior, which is embodied by 
an organization (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126), (Taylor & Hall, 1996, pp. 6-7). The different 
variables created by the institutions shape society into diverse directions, depending 
the choices and events that have taken place. These diverse paths inevitably result in 
different political outcomes. Historical institutionalism is rested upon the above-
mentioned understanding and applies it with the perspective of history to better 
capture and examines changes and adaptation over time. By looking back in history, it 
is possible to examine historical and institutional patterns, which can be used to 
pinpoint whether history will repeat itself (Pierson and Skocpol, 2007). In order to do 
so, this thesis will utilize three distinct tools as established in the theoretical approach 
of historical institutionalism. This includes: institutional distribution, institutional 
development and institutional ideas. These three tools will later be applied to frame 
the analytical work and to answer the problem formulation. 
Institutional distribution  
Pertaining to institutional power distribution, power plays a significant role in 
institutional operation and development. Historical institutionalist highlights how 
institutions distribute power. Within this theoretical underpinning, the concept of 
extractive and inclusive institutions will be used to examine the strength of the 
institutions and how power can be distributed in an institution. An inclusive 
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institution is regarded as better suited for people. This is because the institutions have 
a system of checks and balance, hereby distributing the institutional power over 
many.  
 
These powers are distributed through the means of different rights, such as, 
human rights, gender rights, property right, etc. With the system of checks and 
balances it keeps the politician abide to also follow the institutional rules. In 
contradistinction, extractive institution represents the opposite site of the scale, where 
the rule of law does not apply similarly to everyone. It is an institution type where the 
powerful actors rule and a handful of elites have opportunity in the system (Acemogly 
and Robison, 2012, pp. 429-432). 
Institutional development  
As for institutional development and the theory of path dependency, it 
explains different types and reasons for changes that happen in the institutions. It is 
assumed that changes in institutions are rare phenomena, since the rules of institutions 
are built upon each other, which limits the flexibility for institutional change. Because 
institutional rules are built upon each other, changing one set of rules can affect a 
different set of rules, which makes it difficult to transform existing sets of rules. In a 
scenario where it was possible to change a set of rules, such as, a constitution; it will 
create a rippling long-term effect that will either influence institutional development 
positively or negatively. The fear of negative development can frighten people to 
instead follow the current set of rules even though it is not the optimal solution.  
 
On the other hand, if an institutional change appears this is also known as 
“critical juncture”. A critical juncture occurs when an institutional crisis arises. An 
institutional crisis can emerge from different sorts of reasons, such as: political 
turbulence, external influence such as war and economic crisis. When a crisis appears, 
strong institutions will try to siege the opportunity to create plans in their favor to 
shape a new trajectory that will favor their own institutional expansion. Critical 
juncture allows the opportunity for institutions to create new trajectory where 
institutional development can be built upon. An example of a new trajectory can be 
encapsulated in the commitment issues where an institution decides to create a new 
investment. An investment can take many different forms such as: projects, policy, 
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election, etc. Because of the time, energy and money spent on creating this 
investment, it generates an incentive to complete the investment to maximize 
profits/influence and minimize failures. Over time, this investment creates a new 
trajectory, which will inevitable be self-reinforcing and become part of the 
institutional development. (Taylor & Hall, 1996, pp. 9-10). 
Institutional idea 
Historical institutionalist rarely concludes that the institutions are the only 
variables in the result of policy and that critical juncture is not the only path for 
institutional change. They instead try to understand how ideas and options sometimes 
can guide the institutions towards a new direction over time (March and Olsen, 2006, 
p. 14). The understanding of institutional ideas and fashion wave can help explain 
why certain development or political outcome occur, which otherwise not could have 
been explained by path dependency. This phenomenon is also known as the fashion 
wave. Fashion wave describes how an idea can become the driving force of an 
institutional change where institutions try to mimic success from other institutions to 
create success (Greve, 2000, p. 27-29). An example of fashion wave can be seen in 
the way that the economy is structured, especially in the case that developing 
countries mimic institutional behaviors from developed countries in the hope to gain 
similar success.  
 
The Historical institutionalist approach, including the above-mentioned three 
tools will now be used in the analysis in the chapter below in a combined with various 
empirical materials presented earlier. By analyzing empirical materials gathered from 
different sources, an understanding of Thailand’s institutional development, including 
the development of Thailand’s energy policies can be derived. It is anticipated that 
this will ultimately leads to an answer to the problem formulation of this thesis. 
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7. Analysis 
The analysis will be constructed upon the theoretical foundation of historical 
institutionalism. By applying the theoretical framework to the gathered empirical 
materials, the causality between the dependent variable; “Thai energy policy” and 
the independent variable; “the coup” will be examined. However, before assessing to 
what extent, such causality exits and asserts itself, the analysis will also elucidate the 
reasons of the current political crisis and military coup. The analysis will be 
separated into three sections; each section examines a concept of the historical 
institutionalist approach, namely: institutional- ideas, distribution and development. 
The reason for dividing the analysis into three sections is to explore in further depth 
on; how each concept can assist each other in determining the institutional 
development and contribute to answering the problem formulation.  
 
7.1. Institutional idea 
Having an idea is facile; yet trying to understand how ideas can influence 
others from the institution lens can be a complex process. To simplify the process, the 
concept of fashion wave will be employed to analyze the monarchy and the military’s 
role in the development of Thailand’s current political turmoil. Ultimately the 
understanding of the aggregate picture will strengthen the grasp on Thai society.  
 
7.1.1. Role of the monarchy 
It is undeniable that the most influential person in Thailand is King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej. Since Thai people are taught from their childhood and through school 
education that the King is the wise monarch who singlehandedly and tirelessly 
initiated improvements and development for the nation. The King, as it was taught, 
has provided everything that Thai people needed and therefore they should be forever 
grateful. Everywhere in Thailand, pictures of the monarch are hung on the walls of 
public spaces and private homes to pay respect to the King (Marshall, 2014, pp. 183-
185). 
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In the aftermath of 1997 economic crisis, the current King of Thailand, 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, coined the phrase “Setthakit Pho Phiang”, meaning “just-
enough economy” to the people of Thailand (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 175). This speech 
became the framework for the development of the concept of “Sufficiency Economy 
Philosophy” (SEP) (Grossman, 2015, pp. 34-35). In his speech, he concurred that it is 
not important for Thailand to become the new economic tigers24”of Asia, but “…It is 
much more important to develop an economy where people are self-reliant and have 
an adequate livelihood for themselves.” (Grossman, 2015, p. 34). Moderation is the 
key tenet in his philosophy; through a moderate behavior, resources can be 
maximized and the quality of life can be increased. King Bhumibol Adulyadej says: 
 
”If one is moderate in one’s desires, one will have less craving. If one has less 
craving, one will take less advantage of others. If all nations hold this concept without 
being extreme or insatiable in one’s desire, the world will be a happier place.” 
(Grossman, 2015, p. 35). 
 
The moderation philosophy is synonymous to the concept of “the middle way” 
in Buddhism, which is one of three main pillars of Thailand including, the nation, the 
monarchy and Buddhism (Connors, 2007, p. 82). Thai people have through their life 
been taught to follow the King’s philosophy and his guidance; through the practice 
and guidance of the King’s Philosophy, it was maintained, success and happiness will 
be achieved in life. Propagandist messages are disseminated to emphasize how 
happiness and success can be achieved by pursuing the King’s philosophical 
mandates. The stories include, a boy becoming a great musician (like the King), a 
street vendor kid becoming successful businessman25 (with the use of innovation like 
the King), a girl becoming a great designer (like the queen); all through the practice of 
King’s philosophy and his guidance (Fuller, 2015).  
 
These stories play an important part in sharing success stories to the Thai 
people, hereby reinforcing the sufficient philosophy idea as a mean to success and 
                                                
24 An economic tiger is a country, which undergoes and achieves rapid economic growth. The term is 
originally used to describe the four Asian fast growing economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore.  
25 The commercial of the innovative street vendor can be seen on YouTube; web-link can be found in 
the bibliography chapter (Youtube, 2014). 
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happiness in life. Through the spread of these success stories, the King’s philosophy 
has evolved into a fashion wave and has been adapted as an everyday social practice 
that shapes the Thai values, norms and rules. When an idea evolves into a fashion 
wave and materializes as a practice, it will start asserting itself even further. 
Nonetheless, beneath the facade of good values and humbleness, there lies a more 
complex story of this maneuver. The sufficiency philosophy teaches the Thai people 
to be happy with what they have and to live a simple life without complaints, which 
helps perpetuate and legitimize the considerable gap and level of inequality in 
Thailand.  
 
The progression of evolving the philosophy of the King into a fashion wave 
has contributed to the institutional development of Thailand. The King’s idea has 
become so well embedded in Thai society not only as practice but also as institution. 
Furthermore, this idea has also become incorporated in Thai politics and can be 
discerned in the newly formulated agenda for sustainable development (SDG). The 
SDG is set out to, link economic, social and environmental issues together and to 
develop a more sustainable society (Grossman, 2015, p. 29).  
 
Despite the success of King’s philosophy, there are two new challenges to the 
King’s self-sufficiency philosophy. The first challenge concerns the deteriorating 
health of King Bhumibol, which inevitably will result in the end of his ruling. The 
second challenge is the increasing politicization of the rural people (Jory, 2014). 
These two challenges jeopardize the powerful idea of the King’s sufficient 
philosophy. With a dying King, there is no bewilderment for the military coup in 
2014 including their actions, desperately trying to preserve the institution of the 
monarchy and its philosophy, which has for many decades sustained the capitulation 
of the Thai people. Resting on this premise, the development of the King’s philosophy 
during the economic crisis has been a crucial institutional tool to perpetuate the 
submission of the Thai people. It is also a mean to justify an existence of unequal 
society and maintain the society’s status quo. Indicatively, such ideas have also 
worked in favor of the elites in the Thai society and their financial status by enabling 
policies that favored them. As a result the gap between rich and poor is augmented 
even further.  
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7.1.2. Role of the military 
The monarchy once had power monopoly before the Siamese revolution. 
However, with the creation of constitutional monarchy, some of the power was 
redistributed to other institutions, such as, to the democrat party and the military. 
Since then the monarchy has not been able to exert direct intervention as a powerful 
entity, but was instead forced to exercise its political influence through different 
measures, such as, the King’s philosophy and through the use of proxies.  
 
In the attempt to regain its lost influence, the monarchy utilized its network of 
alliances, which is composed of the traditional elites, in order to besiege the 
situations. The most important alliance became the use of military as a proxy to 
exercise its political influence. Through the usage of the respected King’s ideas and 
godly status, the military successfully has legitimized intervention in the politics with 
the noble aim of protecting/saving the nation and the monarchy. As such, the military 
is viewed as the savior and the guardian of the nation. Through gaining the blessing of 
the King coups were legitimatized, which established the military as indispensable 
institutional actor in Thailand.  
 
Through the authorization of the use of law of lèse-majesté, it was possible for 
the military to maintain its control and status quo (Streckfuss, 2009). Indeed, the 
alliance between the monarchy and the military was a win-win situation. By 
supporting each other, it was possible to increase their overall power grip over 
Thailand. The King could bestow his acceptance and legitimacy in return for political 
influences. By working together it was possible for them to shape Thai society as they 
wished. Yet, there was a downside in the commitment to such alliance. More 
specifically, the interdependency puts them in a fragile situation when separated.  
 
During the political crisis in the year 2005, the presence of the both the 
monarchy and military in the Thai politics has increased dramatically. The law of 
lèse-majesté has been used more frequently to maintain the status quo and to keep the 
politicization of the rural people at bay. Their presence continued as the political 
crisis lingered on, which led to another military intervention in 2014. There are 
several variables that played a role in the political crisis leading to the military coup in 
2014. In this respect, the two most important factors are the two challenges explained 
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earlier, namely, the end of King Bhuimibol’s era and the increasing politicization of 
the rural people. 
 
7.2. Institutional distribution 
Distribution plays a significant role in the development of institutions and the 
establishment of institutionalized parties. This section, will examine whether Thailand 
can be categorized as an inclusive or extractive institution, which will help understand 
the characteristics of Thailand’s democracy.  
 
Countries that are characterized by, separation of power, opportunities for 
social mobilization, privileges to people, provision of basic rights, transparent election 
and acceptance of civil society organizations are categorized as an inclusive 
institution. Nonetheless, holding elections does not automatically imply that people’s 
voices are heard. There are many more fundamental conditions that need to be put in 
place, such as, basic human rights and an enabling social environment to develop. An 
electoral democracy in a developing country is a good example of a lack of 
representation of the population; as a result, election becomes a tool for the elitists to 
exploit for their advantages and positions (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 19).  
 
Thailand emerged as a newly industrialized country in the 1980s. The country 
had attained growth rate as one of the highest in the world. Although its economy has 
developed considerably, Thailand’s affluent society has also been accompanied by 
irreconcilable gap between classes (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 119). Thailand is at present 
among the most unequal countries in Asia, where the 0.1 % of the richest owns over 
50 % of the country’s assets (The Nation, 2014). This inequality has formed what is 
known as the champagne glass distribution26. In this regards, it is important to 
conceptualize the imbalance in Thai society and how the idea of King’s sustainable 
philosophy has contributed to render it socially acceptable.  
 
Inevitably this idea led to asymmetric growth in Thai society, both in social 
status and economic wealth, which has partially become the catalyst of the political 
turmoil separating the country into three distinct classes: elites, middleclass and the 
                                                
26 A term invented by Conley to illustrate the wealth distribution formed as a champagne glass. 
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rural people (Kuhonta, 2011, pp. 4-6 & 150-151). The absence of proper distribution 
mechanism in the society to counterbalance the formation of classes, has led to wealth 
concentration and a more noticeable appearance of class system. 
 
Resting on the above argumentation, the Kingdom of Thailand can therefore 
not be categorized as an inclusive institution. With lack of proper representativeness, 
absence of freedom of speech and distribution mechanism, democracy in Thailand is 
built upon volatile election that are often hindered and prevented by either the 
opposition or by the military. This has resulted in Thailand being poorly 
institutionalized (Nelson, 2011), (Marshall, 2014, p. 8-9).  
 
In other words, the institutions in Thailand are categorized as extractive 
institution, since their governance cannot be acknowledged as fully democratic 
compared to developed democracy. Their way of governance is largely different. The 
country allows undemocratic values to flourish and military intervention to be 
normalized. The way of governance has become so well accepted that the Thai people 
refer to it as Thai style democracy (Marshall, 2014, p. 79), or in a more correct term, 
quasi-democracy, where powerful actors rule and only a handful of people have the 
opportunity to prosper in the society. Through military interventions, it has been 
possible for the military government to weaken the institutionalization process among 
the political parties. The intervention produces detrimental effects as time and again, 
only, a weak governmental coalition, hence a weak democracy are forged.  
 
Owing to constant military interventions, institutionalization of parties was 
obstructed. Political parties flourished and disintegrated shortly after. The short-lived 
nature served as incentive for the political leaders to prioritize self-serving goals 
during the brief period in office. In fact, political parties and leaders in Thailand hold 
no solid ideological ground. Rather, catchall parties27 characterize Thailand’s political 
landscape while its function depends, to a great extent, on personal charisma of 
politicians. As such, personalism pervaded in Thai style democracy, which facilitates 
corruption at all levels. There are many examples in Thailand where bureaucrats 
                                                
27 A political approach in which, a party claims to be open to a wide spectrum of constituents and 
groups. 
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abuse their position for their own benefits 28 . With Méon argues how weak 
institutional framework enables corruption, allowing the bureaucratic system to run 
smoothly with the help of favoritism and corrupt practices. Méon sheds light on this 
framework by comparing corruption to the grease automatically generated in a turning 
wheel, making it spin more smoothly (Méon, 2010). 
 
Reiterating that corruption is perceived an unavoidable occurrence in a weak 
democracy like Thailand, the figure below shows whom the Thai public sees as 
corrupt. As revealed in the figure below, Thai people see the fusion of powers, 
namely, legislature, executive and the judiciary power, including the political parties 
as the most corrupt institutions. In addition, the interesting part is that the military that 
has exercised the power overall institutions is considered least corrupt. The reason for 
such opinion can possibly be located, within the narrative of how the military tends to 
enter the political sphere in time of political crisis and helps remove the self-serving 
and corrupt politicians from position. In this type of discourse, the military, has 
become the protector and the savior of the nation. More importantly, through the 
blessing of the King, the coup is legitimized, hence ratifying the military’s action as 
necessary to resolve any political deadlock making them as a more trustworthy 
authority. 
 
Figure 5: Whom the public sees as corrupt 
 
Source: Grossman, 2015, p. 155 
 
The development of Thailand has evolved around the bureaucratic elitist 
society, that dismisses the rural population from politics (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 123), 
                                                
28 For example, a case of corruption in 1995 led to a demise of Thailand’s Democrat Party. A Member 
of Parliament used her position to distribute land rights to her relatives. The result of the land-reform 
scandal led to the end of the Chuan Leekpais administration and the democrat party (Shenon, 1995). 
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(Kurlantzick, 2011). Yet, given that the majority of Thai population comprises of 
rural dwellers (approximately 80 % of population), it was only a matter of time before 
someone would acknowledge their voices and existence. The rise of Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) party resulted in an unprecedented institutionalization process. The Thai Rak 
Thai party is carved based on a strategic combination of business communities and 
the rural people in its political representativeness. This strategic formation made it 
possible to win the election in the year 2001 and again in the year 2005 with 
remarkable victory. Yet, this newly constructed party had challenged traditional status 
quo. Intensified demonstrations and the competition for the political legitimacy then 
followed. The political battle for legitimacy was fought through a proxy of peoples, 
including the democratic yellow-shirts and the populist red-shirts as discussed in the 
chapter of institutional development.  
 
Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party held tremendous success in Thai politics 
by constructing groundbreaking social reform, particularly the distribution of the 
country’s wealth to disadvantaged section of the society. This has arguably moved 
Thailand towards a more inclusive institution. However, the pseudo-reform was 
merely a mere glimpse of hope for the people. In fact, Thaksin was no different than 
the traditional bureaucrats and utilized his position for private interests. This has 
ultimately cost him not only corruption charges but also exile and a loss of his power. 
 
 In sum, Thaksin's party strategies were craftily designed by campaigners with 
the purpose to maximize votes and gain influence. Thaksin sieged the opportunity to 
expand influence to the poor and uneducated population. This section of the Thai 
society has easily fallen prey to the campaigners who established connection and 
molded their decision; sometimes even evolving vote purchases (Nelson, 2011). In 
other words, the rural people were a sacrifice needed as a mean to achieve Thaksin’s 
and his business communities’ end.  
 
Against a backdrop of a military coup in 2006 and later the designation of 
Abhisit Vejjajiva, a democrat prime minister, the political turmoil started all over 
again with intensified demonstrations for the fight over political legitimacy. Indeed, 
the history of Thailand’s modern politics tends to be unraveled into the same pattern. 
The rise of Thaksin’s supporters; the red-shirts defied the traditional elites, 
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culminating in a military intervention. The coup is normally followed by an election, 
selection or an appointment of a new Prime Minister chosen by the King (Marshall, 
2014, pp. 182-185), with the purpose to re-establish the traditional elites’ status quo.  
 
Resting on the above analysis, the 
Thai style democracy tends to evolve around 
the same political turmoil. Democracy in 
Thailand can be encapsulated into a number 
of characteristics, which are: acceptance of 
inequality, military interventions, elitist 
society, weak parties, weak democracy, and 
self-serving practices in politics and 
corruption.  
 
7.3. Institutional development 
Through the analysis of the above two sections, the complex institutional 
development in Thailand was explained and disentangled. Combining the 
understanding of, the King’s philosophy, the development of the traditional elites and 
the characteristics of Thai style democracy, different causations that lad to Thailand’s 
current political crisis were analyzed.  
 
This chapter will examine the chosen field of research, the power development 
plan, by comparing the strategies and targets of the Power Development Plan 2010, 
2012 and 2015. It will emphasize on the characteristics between energy policy formed 
under EGAT jointly with the Abhisit administration, the Yingluck administration and 
the last one under the administration of National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO). 
To conclude the analysis and answer the problem formulation, there will be conducted 
further analysis with use of the concepts of path-dependency and critical juncture. 
 
7.3.1. Comparing the Power Development Plans 
It was coined out in the empirical chapter under the section of the Thailand 
Integrated Energy Blueprint that the current military government actively pushed for 
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However, this does not capture to what extent the influence expands. Since the 
drafting and synchronizing each of the five plans, was made throughout different sub-
divisions of the Ministry of Energy, it remains unclear whether the plan was 
influenced by the military in the first place. To better comprehend to what degree the 
military government has influenced on Thailand energy policy, a comparison of the 
power development plan 2010, 2012 and 2015 will now be undertaken. 
 
Comparing strategies 
Generally, the strategy of all three Power Development Plans has its main 
fulcrum on the improvement of the energy security of Thailand. This includes the 
following measures; increase the energy efficiency29, increase the use of renewable 
energy sources30and increase the diversification of energy resources. Nevertheless, 
there are some differences concerning how these three plans attempts to increase the 
diversification of energy resources and to what extent it aims to do so. Given that 
Thailand is exceptionally dependent on natural gas for electricity generation and that 
gas resources in the country are depleting; subsidies for electricity generation are 
needed in the future to provide for the growing energy demand.  
 
The Power Development Plan 2010 addressed the issue of energy diversity 
through increasing energy imports from its neighboring countries. However the 
purchase of electricity from its neighboring countries could not exceed the margin of 
25 %. Additionally new power plants will be implemented, such as, clean coal, 
cogeneration and nuclear to generate cleaner and more efficient electricity.  
 
                                                
29 The difference in the strategy of energy efficiency is slim when comparing the two plans. Their 
strategy can be derived from the Energy Efficiency Development Plan (EEDP), the targets vary around 
5 % when comparing the two versions. The 2010 and 2012 plan set its target to reach 25 % within the 
year 2030, whereas the 2015 plan set its goal to reach 30 % within the year 2035. 
30 Whereas, the strategy concerning the increased use of renewable energy sources has been more 
challenging to compare, since the Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP) 2008, 2012 and 2015 
have been formulated differently. In order words: the numbers, graphs and the categorization are 
radically different from each other, making it almost impossible to compare the plans. The 2008 have 
no goals, but try to include renewable energy as part of national agenda. The 2012 plan set its main 
goal to achieve a 25 % reduction of fossil fuel consumption within 10 years, whereas the 2015 plan 
aims to reach 15-20 % of energy generation mix from renewable energy sources. However, these 
targets cannot be compared since they measure different information.  
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The Power Development Plan 2012 focused mainly on addressing the issue of 
energy diversity, through the implementation of new power plants. These power 
plants include; clean coal technology, cogeneration system, nuclear generation and 
lastly, through purchases from neighboring countries. Yet these purchases cannot 
exceed 15 % of the total energy generation.  
 
The Power Development Plan 2015 shares similar features in addressing 
diversity issues, through the implementation of, clean coal technology and nuclear 
generation. Nevertheless, cogeneration system was left outside of the main strategy. 
Additionally, energy purchases from neighboring countries have been prioritized as a 
mean to tackle diversity issues. The purchase, as a result, increased the margin of 
energy import by 20 % of the total energy generation capacity. Aside from addressing 
the issue of energy security through diversity, the Power Development Plan 2015 also 
emphasize on additional features. These features are the construction of new 
transmission and distribution infrastructure to its neighboring countries and the 
introduction of the smart grid technology. Both enable a better-integrated, reliable and 
secure use of renewable energy in the electricity generation mix.  
 
Comparing targets 
The table presented below is a simplified version of future energy mix, as 
shown the table 1, 2 and 4 under the Power Development Plan section of the 
empirical chapter. In the table below, the target percentage that the Power 
Development Plan 2010, 2012 and 2015 try to achieve is shown. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the target of the Power Development Plan 2015 is set 
up to the year 2036, whereas the target of the Power Development Plan 2010 and 
2012 was set up to the year 2030. Yet, the data from all three plans are considered 
comparable as the final expected energy generation in all three plans are similar, 
denoting 54,005 MW in the 2010 plan, 55,130 MW in the 2012 plan and 57,459 MW 
in the 2015 plan.  
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Table 5: Target of Electricity Generation PDP 2015, 2012 and 2010 










Target 2030 Target 2030 Target 2036 
Energy import 20 % 10 % 15-20 % 
Clean coal and lignite 23 % 19 % 20-25 % 
Renewable Energy 6 % 8 % 15-20 % 
Natural Gas 40 % 58 % 30-40 % 
Nuclear 11 % 5 % 0-5 % 
Diesel / fuel oil - - - 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Source: Sutabutr, 2015 and Chimklai, 2012 
 
At the first glance, marked differences can be discerned in regards to: natural 
gas, renewable energy, nuclear and energy imports from neighboring countries. 
Comparing the Power Development Plan 2010 with 2015, the similarities on several 
targets with the expectation of renewable energy and nuclear are evident. The 2010 
plan focused on a higher amount of nuclear generation and focused less on renewable 
energy. In other words, the Power Development Plan 2010 and 2015 shares similar 
characteristics on most parameters. Nonetheless, the major difference can be found in 
the Power Development Plan 2012. Comparing the Power Development Plan 2012 
with the 2010 one; a significant difference between the target of energy import 
varying from 20 % in 2010 plan to 10 % in the 2012 Power Development Plan is 
observed, including substantial differences between the use of gas in electricity 
generation. 
 
When comparing the Power Development Plan 2012 with the one of 2015, 
clean coal including lignite and nuclear are almost identical in both plans. Looking at 
the difference between natural gas, a difference of between 18-28 %% is observed. 
This entails that the 2015 plan prioritizes a higher degree of electricity generation 
mix, compared to the 2012 plan. Yet, the energy generation, which is reduced from 
natural gas in the 2015 plan, will have to be substituted from different sources. In the 
Power Development Plan 2015, the energy generation that substitutes natural gas 
comes dominantly from renewable energy sources through purchase from neighboring 
countries. This is also demonstrated in table 1, 2 and 4 as presented in the Power 
Development Plan chapter. 
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 In all three tables, a significant difference between energy purchases from 
neighboring countries can be discerned. More specifically, in the Power Development 
Plan 2010, it is estimated that renewable energy power plants would generate a value 
of 16,798 MW, where around two-third; 11,669 MW, of the renewable energy 
consisted of energy purchase from neighboring countries. Whereas, in the in the 
Power Development Plan 2012, it was anticipated that renewable energy power plants 
would generate a value of 14.580 MW, where around one-third; 5.099 MW, of the 
renewable energy consisted of energy purchase from neighboring countries. As for 
the Power Development Plan 2015, the renewable energy will generate a value of 
21,648 MW of which nearly half of the value, 9.543 MW, is energy purchased from 
neighboring countries.  
 
In other words, renewable energy imports was prioritized in the 2010 and 
2015 plans as a means to achieve energy diversity, whereas in the 2012 plan it was 
redefined to a lesser part of the strategy of achieving energy diversity. These priorities 
have resulted in the power development plans 2010 and 2015 to generate higher value 
of energy diversity, hence reduce a degree of dependency on natural gas as electricity 
generation for the future. In contrast, the Power Development Plan 2012 put its focus 
on diversifying its energy generation mix through domestic projects, including: 
improved and efficient cogeneration power plants and combined cycle power plants. 
 
7.3.2. Path-dependency and critical junctures 
Through the comparison of the all three Power Development Plans, it can be 
concluded that their strategies share similar characteristics, which are their focus on 
improving the energy security of Thailand through energy diversification. In this 
regards, the Power Development Plan 2012 prioritizes more effective gas and coal 
power plants, such as cogeneration and combined cycle power plants, whereas the 
Power Development Plan 2010 and 2015, prioritizes outsourcing the electricity 
production to its neighboring countries, namely: Lao, Cambodia and Myanmar.  
 
To finalize the analysis, the last two concepts of historical institutionalism will 
be applied to examine and discuss to what degree the military government has 
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influenced in the changes in Thailand energy policy. Through the application of the 
concept of path-dependency, there can be argued whether the Power development 
plan and the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint is a continuation of an already 
posited path or a diversion from a path, meaning it can be categorized as a critical 
juncture. 
Does the Power Development Plan continue on an already posited path? 
The Power Development Plan 2015 can be regarded as continuous process of 
the previous Power Development Plans 2010 for a number of reasons. Firstly, both 
Power Development Plans share a common goal of improving Thailand’s energy 
security by lowering the use of gas in electricity generation. Secondly, the means to 
improve energy security coincide with energy diversification targets that resemblance 
each other. The Power Development Plan 2010 and 2015 are characterized by a more 
drastic measure to improve energy diversity through a subsidy of imported electricity, 
hereby increasing the margin of electricity import by 25 % in 2010 plan and 20 % in 
2015 plan. This measure was anticipated to help reduce the use of gas in the 
electricity generation mix by 30-40 % in the year 2036 for the 2015 plan and 40 % in 
the year 2030 for the 2010 plan. Thirdly, it can be argued that the power plant projects 
created through Power Development Plans are heavy on investment, which requires 
long-term commitment particularly once the investment is approved. This is because 
the approved investment needs to be completed and to yield proven return. Several of 
new power plant projects have already been preceding based on the pervious energy 
policy plans, such as, the Xayaburi dam, which was preceded and included in the 
Power Development Plan 2010 (Deetes, 2012), hereby making them part of all three 
plans.  
 
While the Power Development Plan 2010 and 2015 share similar structures. It 
appears that the Power Development Plan 2012 has its own uniqueness in prioritizing 
investment in efficient domestic gas power plants. This is manifested through the 
implementation of a lower margin of imported electricity, which consists of 15 % of 
the total electricity generation capacity. This would have resulted in 58 % gas mix in 
the electricity generation mix by the end of year 2030. 
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Furthermore, there appears to be a general resemblance in all three Power 
Development Plan concerning the under prioritization of nuclear power plants and the 
prioritization of increased use of renewable energy sources. Indeed the investment 
and risk in building nuclear power plants is remarkably higher, as witnessed in the 
catastrophic nuclear crisis in Japan. The lesson-learned from the tragedy in Japan has 
resulted in a revision of the Power Development Plan, which debunked future hope 
for nuclear power in the country. In contrast, renewable energy generation has 
become more competitive enabling it to better compete with other electricity 
generation sources. In fact, renewable energy accounts for a larger part of the Power 
Development Plan 2015, compared to any previous plans. This situation is indeed 
unprecedented. 
 
Taking into account the above argumentation, it can be concluded that the 
direction of the Power Development Plan 2015 has already been embedded in the 
previous Power Development Plans, particularly the 2010 one. In other words, the 
2015 Power Development Plan is not a trailblazer creating groundbreaking changes in 
Thailand energy policy. Rather, the Power Development Plan 2015 is fortifying the 
already existing path through its emphasis on the strategies to amplify energy 
diversity. This trajectory is further enhanced through the implementation of new 
transmission and distribution infrastructures in Thailand’s neighbors and regions, 
including the introduction of smart grid. To sum up, the Power Development Plan 
2015 is redirecting the 2012 plan back towards its original path and targets. Therefore 
the Power Development Plan 2012 can be considered as a failed attempt in changing 
the trajectory of future energy policy. 
 
Can the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint be considered as a Critical 
Juncture? 
Before a critical juncture can manifest itself, an institutional crisis must firstly 
be present. When a crisis emerges, institutions are pressured to devise innovative 
ideas to pursue new ways to ensure its survival, hence developing an institutional path 
that favors them. From the military and the traditional elites’ perspectives, the current 
political turmoil triggered by the politicization of the rural people is perceived as the 
first crisis that challenges their position. Kuhonta explains how a crisis creates new 
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opportunities for changes to happen. But this also creates an increased pressure for the 
traditional elites to find new ways to ensure their influence in the future. 
  
”During moments of crisis, opportunities open up to advance innovative policies: 
under conditions of perceived crisis, the likelihood of change occurring may be 
greater than when the policy reform is considered a matter of routine” (Kuhonta, 
2011, p. 42). 
 
The crisis triggered by the growing politicization of the rural people led the 
military to respond with a military coup in the year 2006, The coup, made it possible 
for them to maintain their influence for a period of time, allowing them to test the 
water. “A crisis may stimulate action and hence learning on a problem on which 
insight has been low and which for that very reason has not been tackled as long as it 
was in a quiescent state.” (Kuhonta, 2011, p. 42). Yet, with another approaching 
challenge, namely, the weakened King Bhumibol and the succession of the Crown 
Prince, the military is urged to once again siege the opportunity of the political crisis 
to retain the governmental power under the transition period. It was therefore 
necessary for the military and the Thailand’s traditional elites to find innovative 
solutions to maintain status quo.  
 
If the politicization of the rural people had been left to persist, it would have 
hampered the influence and future survival of the military and the traditional elites. 
Ultimately it would result in a critical juncture that would instead favor the newly 
formed institutionalized parties and the rural people. But instead of watching from the 
sideline, the military backed by the traditional elites, seized the opportunity through a 
military coup. The military finds repression through reforms a less costly way to pave 
a path for institutional development, hence influencing and shaping the future 
institutional trajectories 
 
This has led to a series of bold moves that involved rewriting of the 
institutional rules from top-down approach, herby forcing changes throughout the 
Thai society. These bold move involves rewriting the Thai constitutions. Through the 
revision and rewriting process, the military tactfully integrated its strategies and 
interests within the constitution.  
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The ultimate goal is in fact to dismantle populist policies introduced under the 
Thaksin administration, such as, minimum wages and the universal healthcare 
(Somjittranukit, 2016). “It is clear that the military wants to establish itself as a 
political institution enshrined in the constitution. Or, to put it another way, the 
military wants “longevity” in the political system.” (Somjittranukit, 2016). Therefore 
it can be argued that the eleven policy suggestions put forward by the National 
Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), including the framework for the Thailand 
Integrated Energy Blueprint, is an extension of the bold moves to develop a new 
institutional path for Thailand.  
 
Indeed, the process to approve the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint is 
materialized over a long period of time, since all five plans needed approval. The last 
plan to be approved was the Power Development Plan. The plan was endorsed 
through the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) on the 6th May 2015, followed 
by the acknowledgement by the cabinet on the 30th June 2015. As explained 
previously, the members of the National Energy Policy Council consist of the Prime 
Minister, which in this case is the military-junta, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, 
accompanied by a group of chairmen and ministers, all designated by the Junta 
himself.  
 
That is to say, the Junta himself dictates the chain of decisions, therefore 
making it easy to endorse and enforce any bold policies he planned. It can then be 
hailed that the policy suggestion presented by the National Council of Peace and 
Order (NCPO) is part of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint. All five strategies 
of the policies are to be achieved:  
 
• Transparency (the creation of a more cohesive energy policy), 
• Environmental impact (Increased renewable energy output and import), 
• Cooperation with neighboring countries (Creation of better distribution 
infrastructure including the implementation of several new power plants projects) 
• Technology & innovation (The use of clean coal technologies)  
• Economic competitiveness will defiantly improve if the Thailand Integrated Energy 
Blueprint becomes fully implemented and reaches its targets.  
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Despite the fact that the military is successful in maintaining control of the 
government and postpone elections through different means31 the critical juncture has 
not yet occurred. Firstly, the new constitution needs to be enforced through a 
referendum or by other means. After the implementation the referendum most be 
practiced, hereby enabling a new trajectory to be erected. This will make it 
challenging to redirect investments and overwrite written policies, in order to divert 
the trajectory towards a new path. With the rewriting process already in motion, the 
newly revised constitutions will be voted on the 7th august 2016 through a national 
referendum (Niyomyat, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, many of the bold policy reforms that the military government is 
currently pursuing are not built upon creating collective benefits or increasing the 
distribution of institutional power. Despite a possible dismissal of the constitution at 
the national referendum on the 7th August 2016, there are some fundamental issues 
that exist in Thai style democracy, which hampers democracy to prosper. In actuality, 
the reforms require tremendous behavioral adaptation of the Thai population and it 
will be much more difficult to embed the changes through the referendum.  
 
All in all, as Thailand is categorized as extractive institution, the referendum is 
unlikely to have genuine impact. It is likely that the new constitution will be rewritten 
under the guidance of the military and this vicious cycle will continue as long as the 
real democratic system and values have not been institutionally embedded in the 
country and its people. However, unlike the constitution which requires certain 
democratic filters like a referendum, there exist a number of key national policies, 
such as, the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint that lack democratic filters, which 
can intervene policy plans and keep it in check32.  
 
                                                
31 The military government maintains their presence and power in the government through a rejection 
of the new constitution. The Junta appointed the National Reform Council (NRC), which pushes back 
the election until April 2017 (Niyomyat, 2015).  
32 The Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint plans lack public reviews. Only a half-day event was 
allowed for general public to give its feedbacks. Many of the invisible costs of projects are viewed with 
blind eyes and it is rare that the feedbacks are taken into consideration. The reports made by the Thai 
energy experts, Chuenchom Sangsari Greacen and Chris Greacen, in 2012 is a good example 
illuminating the lack of communication and transparency between the people and the government 
(Greacen, 2012),(Meetam & Kiatiprajuk, 2014). 
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To sum up the above discussion; it can be concluded that Thailand Integrated 
Energy Blueprint can be considered as a part of the countless of bold moves that have 
been set in motion and imposed by the military government. These bold moves are a 
result of continued political crisis, which has been pressuring the military and the 
traditional elites to take swift and radical action. These bold moves can therefore be 
viewed as a reaction to the crisis, hence considered as a critical juncture with the 
purpose to create a new institutional trajectory that favors the military and the 
traditional elites, if it becomes successful. 
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8. Conclusion 
Thailand’s democracy is a puzzling phenomenon; the constant rise and fall of 
political parties and continuous political turmoil make it complex to comprehend. 
Despite its complexities, the political trajectory in Thailand appears to be repetitive. 
Indeed, it is the power struggle between the traditional institutions versus the newly 
formed and emerging institutions. There are unquestionably several factors that play 
an important role in the recent political crisis ending once again with a military coup. 
However, the reasons behind the coup are evident. The coup was engineered in view 
of two immanent challenges lingering underneath Thailand’s political landscape. 
These challenges include: the politicization of the rural population and the 
deteriorating health of King Bhumibol. 
 
The two challenges contested the traditional elites, mainly the military and the 
monarchy. As a result, a bold strategy to maintain their status quo was pursued. These 
strategies involved, sieging the government position through a coup, implementation 
of an interim constitution and self-legitimization through the blessing of the King. 
Nonetheless, to further secure their position in the future; additional changes were 
initiated, including the drafting of a new constitution and the implementation of 
several new policies like the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint, hence the Power 
Development Plan.  
 
Rested on background of the above analysis, it can be concluded that The 
Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint can be considered as a critical juncture in 
Thailand Energy policy. This can be argued on three grounds: The first ground lies in 
the absence of democratic filters in the planning process of energy policy. Throughout 
the decision-making process of the Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint, the policy 
was initiated, endorsed and enforced singlehandedly by the National Council of Peace 
and Order (NCPO). In fact, the insertion of a military general as a new minister of 
energy further enhances this skillful maneuver. Secondly, the Power Development 
Plan 2015 is re-correcting and re-steering the deviation attempted in the 2012 plan. In 
this respect, it can be argued that the Power Development Plan 2010 was created 
under the supervision of the traditional elites, since it was formulated under the Prime 
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Minister Abishit’s administration. Thirdly, there exists a general tendency for the 
current military government towards demolishing any key policies shaped under the 
Thaksin era, including the Power Development Plan 2012.  
 
Indeed preference, an arguably, favoritism of Thailand’s traditional elites 
towards energy policy strategies that outsource the country’s energy production to its 
neighboring countries, mainly through hydropower plants is immanent. This 
favoritism raises an important question. “Whether there are any personal motivations 
ingrained in the process of creating future energy policy and the planning of the 
future power plant projects” that can explain the immanent preferences in 
outsourcing electricity production to the neighboring countries. 
 
All in all, there is an additional perspective from a research point of view, 
which need to be further explored to enhance the result of this thesis. This includes a 
more in-depth analysis on the individual level, which has been underexplored through 
the use of an institutionalist approach. However, the historical institutionalist 
approach has an undeniably explanatory power in explaining complex institutional 
processes by investigating the causality link between the military coup and Thailand 
energy policy. This enables systematically tracing process and provides a step 
forward in understanding the complexities of Thai style democracy. Certainly, it 
entails the importance of the roles of the traditional institutions, namely the traditional 
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